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Abstract
The increased involvement of non-state actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
in The increased involvement of non-state actors such as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in shaping various national and global policy processes raises serious questions
about the accountability, authority, and legitimacy of these important yet unelected actors.
Although there is no consensus on how to define accountability, broadly the concept refers
to the idea that some hold others responsible for their actions according to a set of stan-
dards defining proper behavior. However, deciding to whom and to what standards NGOs
are accountable and how they are (or should be) held accountable remain central and open
questions in accountability debates.
This study relies on both qualitative and quantitative methods, introducing the use
of qualitative pattern analysis to understand not only what leaders of TNGOs have to say
about accountability, but also how they describe their accountability experiences. It uses
the TNGO initiative datasets, which include in-depth interview data for 152 CEOs of U.S.-
registered TNGOs, as well as secondary data collected for each of the organizations in the
sample.
Drawing from the nonprofit, management, and international relations scholarship, I
explore the three central questions of accountability debates: What is accountability? Ac-
countable to whom? And how? I argue that once one addresses each of these accountability
questions, taking an actor-centered perspective, it is possible to understand how account-
ability practices vary across transnational NGOs. I propose the concept of accountability
dissonance to explain the disconnect between the three main questions of accountability.
Through the empirical chapters, I show that TNGO leaders expressed often complex views
about their accountability experiences, yet they generally struggled to communicate their
practices. I stress the need to pay attention to the substantive meaning of accountability
messaging and to the connections among definitions, audiences, and responses. The phe-
nomenon of accountability dissonance persists because leaders express their accountability
using tools and processes that are mismatched to their definitions and audiences. Further-
more, the data suggest that the types of organizations TNGO leaders manage matter in very
different ways, contingent on the aspect of accountability being considered. To reach a holis-
tic understanding, I propose an overarching framework using the analogy of the puzzle to
highlight the need for a more integrated approach to TNGO accountability, one hinging on
the ability to target the communication of accountability performance to specific audiences.
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States are not well equipped to deal with the growth of transnational problems such as
poverty, international migration, environmental changes, and humanitarian crises. These
global challenges transcend state borders and call for a broader range of actors to be involved
to provide private solutions to public problems. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)1
are not a new phenomenon (Davies, 2013). It is their greater involvement in world politics
in recent years that has raised serious questions about the accountability, authority, and
legitimacy of these important yet unelected actors involved in shaping various national and
global policy processes (Balboa, 2014; Crack, 2013; Garsten and Boström, 2008; Grant and
1The literature on accountability rarely distinguishes between TNGOs and NGOs. When dis- cussing
the literature, I use these interchangeably. In the context of this research, I primarily use the term non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). I favor Willetts (2011) broad definition of NGO: “an independent
voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than
achieving government office, making money or illegal activities” (5). I use the label NGO instead of other ap-
pellations, such as not-for-profit organization (NPO), charitable organization, voluntary organization (VOs)
or civil society organization (CSOs), mainly because of the academic tradition in international relations.
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Keohane, 2005; Hale, 2008; Koppell, 2010; Uphoff, 1996; Wapner, 2002).
Furthermore, NGOs routinely expect that the credibility of their virtue will enable
them to fulfill their mandates (see Gourevitch et al., 2012; McGann and Johnstone, 2006).
It is often assumed that because they mean well, they actually do well. Despite their good
intentions, several eminently publicized scandals, as well as the post-9/11 scrutiny of char-
itable funds uses, have shaken their credibility and marked “the end of blind faith” toward
TNGOs’ activities. Shortly after 9/11, several charities with Islamic ties were investigated
and assets frozen (see Cohen et al., September 25, 2011; Shenon and Lewis, December 7,
2001; Gibelman and Gelman, 2001).2 Furthermore, the natural disasters in Southeast Asia
(2004) and Haiti (2010) have again forced the issue of NGO accountability back onto the
public agenda after several controversies emerged regarding the most effective intervention
methods, the use of donations, and allegations of wrongdoing by organizations on the field3,
and allegations of wrongdoing by organizations on the field4.
Broadly, accountability is a relational concept and refers to the idea that some stake-
holders are entitled to hold others responsible for their actions according to certain expecta-
tions of proper behavior (Ebrahim, 2005; Grant and Keohane, 2005). Aside from suffering
from conceptual blurriness and disagreement on how to define accountability beyond the tra-
2Perhaps one of the most notorious scandal in the U.S. being the case of United Way (see Murawski, July
13, 1995).
3For example, Médecins sans Frontières, a Nobel prize winning NGO, created a controversy within the
NGO community when it decided to stop accepting donations toward the Tsunami victims and did not
re-allocate donations onto other programs or NGOs (see Benhold, January 7, 2005)
4Shortly after the earthquake struck, 10 members of the New Life Children’s Refuge based in Idaho were
arrested after allegedly crossing the border to the Dominican Republic without proper authorization with
33 young children (see Ogle, January 31, 2010).
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ditional models of the donor-recipient relationship or upward accountability (Kearns, 1996;
Najam, 1996), most scholars interested in NGO accountability have agreed on the central
questions of these debates: accountable to what, to whom, and how? (see Ebrahim, 2003a;
Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Kearns, 1996).
These central questions cut across disciplinary boundaries, as they each stress an
important aspect needed to understand NGO accountability. In their discussions of def-
inition (what is accountability?), scholars have proposed various models, from an agent-
principal relationship to a multidimensional approach, with various latent dimensions, such
as transparency and responsiveness, in an effort to understand the meaning and effects of
accountability. In regard to various stakeholders or accountability audiences (accountable
to whom?) discussions have focused on the multiple and sometimes conflicting relationships
between a NGO’s constituents. Lastly, scholars and practitioners alike have debated the
range of adequate accountability responses (accountable how?) often by focusing on finan-
cial disclosure, evaluation tools, and more participative approaches to the involvement of
stakeholders beyond donors.
While the discussions around these questions of accountability have highlighted the
complexity of scholarly debates, simultaneously engaging practitioners and scholars from a
range of disciplines, they also have overwhelmingly represented TNGOs as unitary actors,
minimizing the importance of leaders and the politics within these transnational organiza-
tions. This gap is notable for several reasons, as the role of NGO leadership is crucial to
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several areas, such as managerial practices, governance, and capacity building (see Hailey
and James, 2004; Mintzberg, 2006; Smillie and Hailey, 2001). TNGO leaders have the au-
thority to shape the answers to each of the central accountability questions, yet they have
systematically been ignored in these debates. They not only have an active role in setting the
various agendas of organizations, but also manage, negotiate, and supervise all accountability
relationships with stakeholders. These leaders must implement accountability across various
borders and balance financial incentives, organizing principles, and operational constraints,
while addressing multiple accountability demands from their broad and diffuse international
constituencies. Ultimately, TNGO leaders are the ones being sanctioned by their boards in
the event of egregious mistakes in the organization; thus, their inclusion in accountability
debates is not only important, but necessary.
I focus my analysis on the perceptions and beliefs of these central stakeholders and
adopt an actor-centered perspective.5 II take the position that the leaders of these organiza-
tions are uniquely positioned in an accountability nexus as they negotiate between internal
organizational demands for accountability and external operational constraints faced by their
organizations. Studying leaders of TNGOs is particularly useful since “actors define who they
are and what they want with reference to the dominant roles and ideologies of their time”
(Klotz and Lynch, 2007, 11). In other words, understanding the awareness of these lead-
ers regarding their accountability can enable us to provide a coherent and representative
framework for practitioners within global governance.
5For instance, research has shown convincingly that advocates’ views about salient issues influence the
adoption of particular advocacy issues onto the policy agenda (see Carpenter, 2007a,b).
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Drawing from the scholarship on nonprofits management, and international relations,
I explore the three central questions of accountability debates?what is accountability, ac-
countable to whom, and how? I argue that once we address each of these accountability
questions taking an actor-centered perspective, we can understand how and why account-
ability practices vary across transnational NGOs. I propose the concept of accountability dis-
sonance to explain disconnects among the three main questions of accountability. Through
the empirical chapters, I show that the TNGO leaders expressed often-complex views about
their accountability experiences and that they struggle to communicate their practices. I
stress the need to pay attention to the substantive meaning of accountability messaging and
the links between definitions, audiences, and responses. The phenomenon of accountability
dissonance persists because leaders express their accountability using mismatched tools and
processes to arrive at their definitions and reach their audiences. Furthermore, the data
suggest that the types of organizations TNGO leaders manage matter in very different ways,
depending on which aspect of accountability is being considered. To reach a holistic under-
standing, I propose an overarching framework using the analogy of the puzzle6 to highlight
the need for a more integrated approach to TNGO accountability, hinging on the ability to
target the communication of accountability performance to specific audiences.
6I have come across a consulting firm that used the notion of an accountability puzzle albeit in a very
different way. Their goal as I understand it is to promote a business model to increase organizational
performance. Their puzzle is composed of four pieces: clear expectation, specific data and time, ownership
and sharing. Although they use the label “accountability”, their interest seem to lie in the efficiency of the
organization in a business setting. For more information, please consult: http://www.dynamicresults.com
[Last visited April 15, 2013].
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Organization of the dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I organize my discussion
around the three core questions of accountability debates. In the first section,What is ac-
countability? I discuss the various literatures associated with NGO accountability, and I
address the challenges of defining the concept for non-state actors such as TNGOs. . I argue
that these overlapping debates add to the confusion regarding NGO accountability because
of disciplinary myopia. In the second section, Accountable to whom? I show the range of
possible stakeholders relationships to highlight the relational nature of the concept. In the
third section of the chapter, accountability how?, I discuss the wide array of methods to
implement accountability, and their related challenges.
In chapter 3, I discuss the data and the research strategies. I first present the Moyni-
han Transnational NGO Initiative7, which provided the data for this research project. In
this chapter, I discuss the main aspects of the Initiative’s research design, and I address
some of its potential limits. I pay particular attention to the coding methods of the 152
open-ended interviews, using the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.TI. I discuss my
analytical strategies: an inductively-oriented interpretative content analysis approach to the
interview data. While interpretative content analysis allowed me to systematically study
what respondents answered, I also use an adapted version of sequence analysis (SA) or what
7The research for this project is partly supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-0527679
(Agents of Change: Transnational NGOs as Agents of Change: Toward Understanding Their Governance,
Leadership, and Effectiveness) and the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs.
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I call qualitative pattern analysis (QPA) to efficiently analyze how respondents answered
each central question about accountability. This enabled me to offer a more nuanced un-
derstanding of views on transnational NGO accountability and offer a new approach to the
analysis of larger amounts of qualitative data.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 follow similar structures. Each of these chapters is divided in
three main sections. Each chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I discuss the
leaders’ views on the core questions of accountability: its definition (what is accountability?),
its audience (accountable to whom?) and the response to it (or accountable how?). I present
the main themes expressed by the respondents, as well as illustrative quotations. To do so,
I use both interpretative content analysis and QPA. Second, I analyze how these views vary
in relation to operational context. I study variations of accountability views in relation to
the sizes of organizations, their financial health, main activities (service or advocacy), and
their sector of activities (Environment, Human Rights, Relief, Development, and Conflict
Resolution).
Chapter 4focuses on the question, what is accountability? In it, I discuss three types
of definitions leaders expressed in their answers. I found that leaders of TNGOs define their
accountability in three different ways. Their answers suggest what I call, a materialistic
understanding of accountability, where definitions centered on organizational resources, a
principled understanding (whereby leaders expressed an ethical view of accountability), and
a legalistic view (whereby leaders stressed rules and codes). While the data suggest a strong
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emphasis on materialistic definitions of accountability, which are consistently portrayed in
the literature, QPA reveals more nuanced views expressed by the leaders of TNGOs. Fur-
thermore, I found significant relationships between the size of a TNGO and an emphasis
on more materialistic definitions of accountability, with small organizations focusing on this
type of definition to a greater extent than large organizations. I also found that the leaders
of larger organizations are more nuanced in their definitions than other leaders. In regard
to their activities, I explain that advocacy organizations do not focus mainly on their prin-
ciples, but rather are more preoccupied by a materialistic understanding of accountability
than other types of organization. Lastly, I found that leaders of environmental organizations
express, by far, the most complex views about accountability, discussing all three aspects of
these definitions.
In chapter 5, I analyze the leaders’ accountability audiences. This chapter directly
addresses the question, accountable to whom? I distinguish among three main sets of stake-
holders: patrons, clients, and self & peers. I found that while patrons, such as boards and
donors, are important for everyone, only very few leaders focus solely on clients. Their
audiences suggest a balance between patrons and clients, instead of a simple trade-off. Ac-
countability to oneself, or to peers, appears to be salient for mid-sized organizations but not
so much for large or small organizations. Lastly, the leaders of environmental organizations
focus far less on their clients compared to other types of leaders. This suggests that the
types of issues they address shape their accountability views, as these leaders expressed a
more diffuse understanding of their audience.
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In chapter 6, I study leaders’ views on the implementation of accountability, an-
swering the question, accountable how? Generally, I found that the leaders of TNGOs lack
sophistication regarding the way they respond to accountability demands. Their answers
generally converge on a few simple means of implementing accountability. These means tend
to be geared toward their patrons and neglect other types of stakeholders. While I found
some evidence of more complex processes for implementing accountability, such as stake-
holder consultations, the leaders of these organizations still rely on simple available tools,
despite the potential for an accountability dissonance between what is being implemented
and the tool used to evaluate or report it.
In chapter 7, I analyze the obstacles leaders face in their accountability efforts. I
found that the leaders expressed three sets of concerns. They discussed three main challenges
associated with the concept of accountability itself. First, leaders view the conceptualization
of accountability outcomes as an important obstacle to the communication of accountability.
They find that they have only very limited tools to describe their accountability outcomes,
and thus feel unable to fully prove to all their stakeholders their complete accountability.
A second set of accountability obstacles is related to governance structures and sys-
tems. The leaders discussed monitoring problems as well as systematically enforcing evalu-
ation. This is both a product of the lack of designated resources for accountability and an
institutional “laziness” on the part of some leaders.
A last set of concerns is driven by communication challenges. These challenges are
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linked to the leaders’ ability to convey relevant information to their stakeholders and to
signal their performance through their ratings.
Lastly, in the concluding chapter, I reflect on the core findings of this dissertation. I
discuss one of the most important yet neglected aspects of integrating all the accountability
questions into one comprehensive framework. I argue that the communicative dimension
of accountability is where the most work is needed. While leaders acknowledged the im-
portance of disclosure and transparency, their answers do not explain how they disseminate
what they do about organizational accountability. I argue that the phenomenon of account-
ability dissonance is explained by the inability of leaders to effectively communicate their
accountability. This piece of a larger accountability puzzle, a framework that I propose in the
conclusion, ties together the several components of accountability and illustrates the need to
think about accountability as a system rather than in terms of individual pieces. The ability
to understand not only the connections among the core questions of accountability, but also
the ideas and motivations of the practitioners providing the answers, is key to moving to an
integrated understanding of accountability views and practices in global governance. I end




An Overview of TNGO
Accountability
Accountability: Conceptual clarifications
The issue of accountability is a core governance concern for TNGOs and those associat-
ed with their work, particularly in light of their role as private providers of publicly funded
public goods (Candler and Dumont, 2010).The increasing emergence of transnational enti-
ties and phenomena (Garsten and Boström, 2008; Mason, 2005, see) has challenged NGOs
and their leaders to balance their multiple accountability demands in new, innovative, and
transnational ways (see Ebrahim and Weisband, 2007; Steffek and Hahn, 2010). NGOs often
rely on accountability mechanisms that go beyond formal legal requirements; they develop
informal, often self-appointed, strategies to assess their own accountability(Peruzzotti, 2006,
53). However, the increasing legitimacy conferred upon NGOs in world affairs has also been
decried by skeptics, who ask: “Who Guards the Guardians?” (The Economist , September
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18, 2003).
An important lesson to be learned from the scholarship related to NGO accountability
is that although accountability is a core governance concern for any type of organization1, the
concept can have different meanings for various people, and often lacks conceptual clarity in
popular use (Kearns, 1996, 94; Koppell, 2005, 43). To add to the general confusion, scholars,
the media, and NGOs themselves have used multiple labels to discuss the broad notion of ac-
countability, including answerability and liability. Intuitively, the concept of accountability
often evokes notions of responsibility, trust, legitimacy, integrity, power, authority, efficiency
and credibility. Although these concepts are related to accountability discussions, their in-
terchangeable use has only confused definitions further. Bovens (2007) offers an informative
discussion of the historical evolution of the word, which until recently was closely associated
with bookkeeping. Particularly telling is that in several languages the word accountability
has no direct equivalent, but is mostly translated as responsibility. While the notion of re-
sponsibility identifies those whose duty it is to act appropriately, the notion of accountability
distinguishes itself because it aims to provide answers about actions and behavior that have
already occurred and thus need to be evaluated against set goals (see Kaler, 2002). This is
an important distinction: accountability is the a posteriori evaluation of one?s impact on
other stakeholders, and relies on the notion of responsibility, which is the a priori rule set-
ting expectations before an action has even occurred. Being accountable includes the a priori
1For example, despite the undesirable premises of some private organizations such as terrorist groups
and their campaigns of violence, these organizations are held accountable for their actions directly by their
members and supporters, who condone violence as a suitable means of achieving organizational goals.
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rules, standards and shared understandings of those in charge, as well as the a posteriori
evaluations of relevant impacts. How one designs these rules is contingent on the context,
the actors, and the activities being considered. Other important concepts often associated
with accountability are the notions of efficiency and effectiveness. Whereas efficiency is a
measure seeking to convey the usage of resources, such as the overhead ratio, effectiveness
is related to the ability of an organization to accomplish its goals and objectives; both are
related to the ‘performative’ aspect of accountability and less to its substantive meaning for
the parties involved. Lastly, the concept of credibility is often linked to accountability, as it
is deeply rooted in the construction of shared standards, rules, and understandings in regard
to stakeholder relationships. All of these interrelated concepts are important components of
what ‘being accountable’ means.
The issue of NGO accountability (or the lack thereof) raises the familiar central
questions: accountable to what, to whom, and how? (Ebrahim, 2003a; Kearns, 1996; Ed-
wards and Hulme, 1996) However, despite a consensus on these key questions, as well as
the acknowledgment of a wide array of potential stakeholders involved in the politics of
accountability—namely, donors, governments and their laws, staff and membership, benefi-
ciaries and the general public (Blagescu et al., 2005; Brown and Moore, 2001; Brown and
Jagadananda, 2007; Ebrahim, 2005; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fox and Brown, 1998; Jordan
and Van Tuijl, 2006; Kearns, 1996; Najam, 1996; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006b; Wapner,
2002)— the literature remains as heavily biased towards financial accountability and to
donors as it was more than fifteen years ago (see Najam, 1996). This bias has added to the
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growing confusion about what “private” accountability means because debates have overem-
phasized some dimensions over others and narrowed the relevant stakeholders to mainly
donors. Indeed, several calls for accountability “reforms” have stressed the importance of a
diverse range of accountability relationships and the strengthening of accountability institu-
tions and practices (Crack, 2013).
Scholars have noted the rise of an “accountability industry” governed by formal and
informal codes of conduct (Hallström, 2008) and have described its evolution along two
important waves of reforms (Crack, 2013). The first “wave” was characterized by the emer-
gence of an “upward”— to donors— accountability culture within international NGOs and
more ”resource-oriented” practices of accountability. The second wave of reforms was aimed
at broadening the scope of accountability to include organizational principles and missions
(Crack, 2013, 297–302). The current accountability context seeks to balance and reconcile
the tensions between resource and principle-oriented accountability demands.
The recent growth of accountability standards and rating agencies within the TNGO
community suggests the presence of an important demand for, and interest in, such initia-
tives; the International NGO Charter, established in 2006, is one important example of the
ongoing transnationalization of standards. Despite several NGOs’ adopting various external
accountability standards to signal appropriate behaviors, primarily to potential donors (see
Prakash and Gugerty, 2010), scholars have yet to agree on the effect of ratings and standards
on donors’ behavior (Gordon et al., 2009; Sloan, 2009). This sustained emphasis on financial
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performance and transparency proposes a simple and attractive solution to TNGOs? ac-
countability public perception problems: disclose your financial statements, and you will be
considered as “being accountable.” However, this narrow view of accountability, prevalent
in the first accountability “wave” as noted by Crack (2013)), equates accountability with a
TNGO?s disclosure of financial activities. This “solution” has the potential to undermine
organizations favoring less result-oriented missions, as they face challenges in demonstrating
their effectiveness. This “disclosure” approach does not shed any light on other types of
accountability relationships that might emerge within the organization, notably with the
beneficiaries, staff, peers, partners, and members of these transnational organizations.
Organization of the chapter
My goal in this chapter is to discuss the complexities associated with the study of
accountability for TNGOs and their leaders. The chapter is organized in three main parts.
In the first part, I discuss the definition of NGO accountability and the challenges associated
with it. While many agree on the paramount importance of the notion of NGO governance,
there is a persistent lack of conceptual consensus. I argue that this confusion is mainly
linked to its conceptual and operational complexity. Other factors, such as disciplinary biases
and emphases, also contribute to muddying the discussion. I then turn my attention to a
discussion on the stakeholders involved in TNGO accountability. I highlight the importance
of considering the concept as relational. I argue that the definition of accountability and those
whom accountability involves must be considered simultaneously, as these two questions are
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closely tied to each other. In the third section, I focus my attention on the various strategies
deployed to implement TNGO accountability. I discuss the prevalence of the tools and
processes designed to enable organizational accountability. In conclusion, I reflect on the
role of leadership for NGO accountability and highlight the politics of accountability within
and between TNGOs. By focusing on leadership views of accountability, this projects take
an important, yet often neglected, step in the investigation of NGO accountability: the study
of accountability ideas and the challenges associated with them in TNGOs.
What is NGO accountability?
Broadly, accountability is linked to public expectations about performance, respon-
siveness and morality (Kearns, 1996, 7). These expectations regarding appropriate behav-
ior, whether explicit or implicit, will determine if one is “being accountable” to another
constituent. If constituents do not align their expectations, any evaluation of one’s account-
ability will conclude in a lack of perceived accountability for one set of the stakeholders
involved (see Brown, 2007; Ebrahim, 2005, 2003b). Bovens (2007, 450) highlights the social
aspect of accountability when he notes:
...[A]ccountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences.
These interactions are built on a recognition of the regulative and constitutive nature of
accountability relationships (Brown, 2007, 207). Furthermore, Bovens (2007)’s remark an
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important problem for NGO accountability: one’s ability to “punish” stakeholders for be-
haviors deemed inappropriate by the parties involved in accountability relationships. Simi-
larly, Hale (2008) describes accountability as an amalgamation of two important concepts:
“answerability— ‘the right to receive information and the corresponding obligations to re-
lease details’— and enforcement— ‘the idea that accounting actors do not just ?call into
question” but also “eventually punish” improper behavior?? (p. 76). While the ability to
impose sanctions on NGOs is limited but possible, especially through financial incentives,
monitoring and enforcement are most problematic. The sheer number and types of NGOs
make the costs of monitoring and enforcement highly inefficient and improbable.
The study of NGO accountability is complicated by three important factors. First,
the concept of accountability, like other widely used social science concepts, is multidi-
mensional and multilevel. Approaching accountability as a multidimensional and multilevel
entity requires that one consider three levels of concept development: a basic level, used in
theoretical propositions; a second level, composed of constitutive dimensions; and a third
and more concrete level, composed of the indicators used during the operationalization phase
(Goertz, 2006; Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). A multidimensional approach also provides us
with useful information on the various aspects of accountability (Blagescu et al., 2005; Kop-
pell, 2005, 2010; Kovach et al., 2003) and thus could potentially promote organizational
learning, as Ebrahim (2005) suggests.
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The various dimensions of accountability most often discussed by NGO scholars in-
clude: transparency, effectiveness, participation, liability, controllability, responsibility, eval-
uation and responsiveness (Blagescu et al., 2005; Koppell, 2005, 2010; Kovach et al., 2003),
transparency probably being one of the most emphasized aspects of accountability, as it
is central to assuring future donations (Lawrence and Nezhad, 2009). However, all these
concepts are not only interrelated, but also multidimensional and multilevel. Scholars in-
terested in NGO accountability have particularly relied on these multilevel and dimensional
concepts to define it, adding to the general confusion. Table 2.1 illustrates some of the key
authors addressing the issue of NGO accountability and highlights the various dimensions
they emphasize as they propose definitions. Although they collectively provide a greater un-
derstanding of the issue from various academic perspectives, they do not provide a holistic
understanding. For instance, Edwards and Hulme (1996) emphasize two important dimen-
sions of NGO accountability in the definition they propose. Authority in one setting might
not equate to authority in another, and more so in a context where rules and responsibility
are very informal and self-imposed, as in the NGO sector.
The literature on NGOs is inherently interdisciplinary, as are issues of accountabil-
ity. While most researchers would agree that the definition of accountability includes some
form of responsibility to account for an organization?s impact on its stakeholders, scholars
across disciplines have emphasized very different aspects of accountability issues. Figure 2.1
illustrates the various emphases and the overlap between these clusters of literature, while
the highlighted overlap indicates where my research is located.
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Table 2.1: Definitions and dimensions of Accountability
Study Definition Dimension emphasized
Edward and Hulmes
(1996)
“Accountability is generally interpreted as the
means by which individuals and organizations
report to a recognized authority (or authori-
ties) and are held responsible for their actions
(p.8)
Authority, Enforceability
Kearns (1996) “The discussion thus far has illustrated that
the notion of accountability contains as many
as three dimensions: the higher authority
to whom organizations and individuals are
accountable, the standards of performance-
explicit or implicit- for which organizations
are held accountable, and the responses
to the accountability environment-tactical or
strategic-from inside the organization.” (p.43)
Authority, Performance/ Eval-
uation, Responsiveness, Gover-
nance system(s) (implicit or ex-
plicit).
Ebrahim (2003, 2003b) “It may be defined not only as a means
through which individuals and organizations
are held responsible for their actions (...),
but also as a means by which organizations
and individuals take internal responsibility for
shaping their organizational mission and val-
ues, for opening themselves to public or ex-
ternal scrutiny, and for assessing performance








“Accountability, as we use the term, implies
that some actors have the right to hold other
actors to a set of standards, to judge whether
they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light
of these standards, and to impose sanctions if
they determine that these responsibilities have




Koppell (2005) No definition offered but discussed as an com-




Blagescu et al. (2005) “the processes through which an organisation
makes a commitment to respond to and bal-
ance the needs of stakeholders in its decision-
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Figure 2.1: Clusters of literatures on NGO accountability
First, the public management and policy literature, and organization theory scholars
in particular, have understood issues of NGO accountability in terms of agency theory, by
which principals expect agents to accomplish tasks they delegate. Where the fundamental
problem lies is in the costs associated with monitoring the agents’ behavior and in their
resulting inability to do so (see Eisenhardt, 1989). In other words, donors expect NGOs to
act according to their preferences, despite potential conflicting interests, yet NGOs do not al-
ways have the resources nor the will to effectively monitor these activities. This approach has
paid more attention to the donor-NGO relationship than to NGO-beneficiary interactions.
It also has also largely ignored the possibility of donors and NGOs being simultaneously
principals and agents, depending on the context of the interaction (Ebrahim, 2003b). Other
understandings of NGO accountability stem from the resource dependence literature, where
proponents posit that NGOs are accountable to donors (mainly) because they are depen-
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dent on the external resources donors provide to the organization to ensure its long-term
survival (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003 [1978]). This approach sheds an important light
on the power of distribution and cooptation in an NGO?s operational environment. Other
approaches, such as institutional isomorphism, provide an interesting explanation as to why
NGOs tend to converge toward very few strategies for disclosing their accountability to their
stakeholders. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) explain that organizations face important chal-
lenges when communicating with their stakeholders and therefore use recognized signals to
maintain trust. Applied to the context of NGO accountability, institutional isomorphism
helps us understand why NGOs would adopt well recognized ratings for accountability, de-
spite their shortcomings, as an important signal of legitimacy to their stakeholders. Lastly,
policy and management scholars have suggested strategic approaches to NGO accountability;
one strategic managerial approach highlights the choices and tactics of leadership in achiev-
ing NGOs’ goals and objectives (Kearns, 1996; Smillie and Hailey, 2001). Managers face
accountability demands while balancing their organizational constraints in meeting these
demands. They select strategic (proactive) or tactical (reactive) strategies to accomplish
their goals and respond to various accountability demands from a range of stakeholders. Yet
these approaches do not shed light on the content of the motivations of those engaged in
accountability, nor the challenges they face in their activities.
Second, the international relations and political science literature has focused on
the issue of “lack of accountability” or, more generally, the “democratic deficit” that has
plagued IOs (see Moravcsik, 2004; Nye Jr, 2001), and by extension, NGOs. This focus is
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understandable because of the state-centric bias of the discipline, and thus, the analysis
of a problem (accountability) with an enforcement mechanism (elections) results de facto
in an intractable problem (a democratic deficit), as NGOs will never have all the formal
accountability mechanisms states have at their disposal. Although transnational advocacy
networks relied on what Keck and Sikkink (1998) referred as “accountability politics,” i.e.
“the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles” (p.16),
little has been done in international relations research on the content of the motivation
behind these efforts, and the debate has centered on the dichotomy between principled ideas
and material interests to explain TNGO behaviors (Büthe et al., 2012, see).
Other disciplines have greatly influenced our notions of accountability. Ac counting
and economics have both emphasized financial and fiscal incentives to explain why an organi-
zation and its agents would be accountable to others. Sociologists and anthropologists have
highlighted the participatory dimensions of NGO accountability, as well as the emancipatory
potential of accountability relationships involving the beneficiaries of transnational NGOs.
Audience: Accountable to whom?
Many scholars have proposed models defining accountability as a set of relationships
among stakeholders (see Behn, 2001; Brown and Moore, 2001; Ebrahim, 2003b; Edwards and
Hulme, 1996; Morrison and Salipante, 2007; Najam, 1996). Stakeholders’ roles and identities
in these accountability interactions characterize the terms of the relationship and determine
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the parameters of accountability demands from one party on the other(s). An important
attribute of accountability relationships to consider is the underlying power dynamics and
politics at play. NGOs see their organizational survival threatened if they do not satisfy
the accountability demands from their constituencies and stakeholders, particularly those
of their donors (Wapner, 2002, 158). Ebrahim (2005) suggests that the implementation of
accountability reflects stakeholders’ relationships and that asymmetrical power distribution
within these relationships can result in skewed accountability mechanisms that often favor the
dominant actors (p. 60). This dependency on donors can create tension between the purpose
of the organization and donor satisfaction, the latter being key to future organizational
survival. There are various sources of potential disagreement between NGOs and their
patrons, particularly in areas involving the assessment and evaluation of accomplishments.
Mainly, they disagree on what to evaluate and how to do it, as well as on the purpose and
effects of performance reviews that could hinder a NGO’s willingness to experiment and
learn from failure. For instance, donors’ accountability demands tend to focus on short
term “products”— quantifiable outputs— such as the number of trees planted, and less on
less quantifiable social change whereas other stakeholders, such as members or beneficiaries,
might be more interested in long-term social change (Ebrahim, 2003a, 817).
While the literature has often proposed models of accountability as a form of relation-
ship between a narrow set of stakeholders (mainly between organizations and their donors),
it has been less successful in operationalizing broader definitions of accountability that go
beyond accountability to patrons. Najam (1996) discusses three types of accountability rela-
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tionships at pldiscusses three types of accountability relationships at play: to patrons (those
who provide the NGO with goods and services), to clients (the recipients of these goods and
services), and to oneself (that is, accountability on the part of the organization and individ-
uals to the goals of the organization, its staff, supporters and nonpaying members) (Najam,
1996, 348). These three groups of stakeholders interact in various ways, and their account-
ability relationships can be characterized as “upward” (toward patrons), “downward” (from
patrons to beneficiaries), and “horizontal” (within groups of stakeholders). Unerman and
O’Dwyer (2006a) described this last form of accountability as an informal type of account-
ability among members of a group, and between NGOs. These relationships are characterized
by the power distribution among these stakeholders, where upward and downward account-
ability refer to a vertical and unbalanced distribution, and horizontal to shared power among
stakeholders. Figure 2.2 illustrates the main stakeholders and accountability relationships of
a TNGO, integrating the models of both Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006a) and Najam (1996).
Issues of conflict and power are important when considering these relationships. As
figure 2.2 illustrates, these multiple relationships can be problematic, as goals and interests
among the different parties may not align closely. This can lead to a “multiple accountability
disorder” (MAD), where an organization tries to be accountable to all, yet ends as being
accountable to none (Koppell, 2005, 2010). The various groups of stakeholders identified by
Najam (1996) will guide the empirical analysis of chapter 5. In the next section, I discuss
strategies for implementing NGO accountability.
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Figure 2.2: Stakeholder relationships
Accountable how?
Scholars have talked about the mechanisms, tools, and processes of implementing
accountability at various levels. At the global level, they (Grant and Keohane, 2005; Hale,
2008) have noted various broader mechanisms at play. Grant and Keohane (2005) pro-
pose three global accountability mechanisms particularly relevant for non-state actors such
as TNGOs: peer, market, and reputational accountability. The peer mechanism refers to
the reciprocity of agreements between organizations and their peers; the market mechanism
emphasizes the influence of consumers and investors and their sanctioning capabilities; the
reputational mechanism relates to the idea of “soft power,” where credibility is relevant in
some situations for constraining reproachable behavior. Although not specifically addressing
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TNGOs, Hale (2008) also suggests key “tools of enforcement” (p.71–90) available in global
governance. As with the reputational mechanism, Hale (2008) discusses the role of public
discourse and international norms in shaping actors’ behaviors. He also refers to market pres-
sures and the increased need to address a product’s social and environmental impact. Lastly,
he discusses transparency as a tool providing credibility to those disclosing information and
as a signal of appropriate behavior, which in turn fosters self-compliance.
At the organizational level, scholars have discussed various mechanisms, tools, and
processes that can foster NGO accountability. Transparency is perhaps the tool most em-
phasized by scholars (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007; Carman, 2010; Ebrahim, 2003a). It
refers more specifically to the disclosure systems and related processes that are often tied
to legal requirements. Evaluation, i.e. the monitoring and assessment of achievements and
performance, is another commonly used tool. Two types of assessment are typically done on
NGOs. External evaluations are used to determine results, impacts and future funding, while
internal ones are used to evaluate achievements relating to goals, missions, and management
performance (Ebrahim, 2003a, 817). Participative strategies, a process for implementing
NGO accountability, stress the involvement and representation of key stakeholders in the
decision-making processes of the organization. Ebrahim (2003a) distinguishes participation
from other mechanisms, stating that it is a “process mechanism” rather than a tool. He
further differentiates among various levels of participation (consultation, active involvement,
decision-making, and independent initiatives) (Ebrahim, 2003a, 818). Ebrahim (2003a) also
suggests the use of social auditing as a means of fostering dialogue among stakeholders
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regarding the organization’s ethical behavior, a reliance on self regulation, and the develop-
ment of common standards and codes of conducts to foster NGO accountability. Carman
(2010) suggests that NGO accountability tools should be developed based on evidence-based
programming, to better assess the achievement of accountability goals, and suggests that
NGOs be explicit about their theories of change.
Ebrahim (2003a) notes a difference between tools— discrete devices emphasizing
outcomes— and “process mechanisms” —mechanisms that emphasize a broader course of
action— of accountability (Ebrahim, 2003a, 815–816). However, important distinctions
should be made among tools, mechanisms, and processes to help us understand the ac-
countability landscape. While authors often use these terms interchangeably, adding to the
conceptual confusion, a useful distinction is offered by Tilly (2001), who articulates three
types of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational. The first type, environmen-
tal, relates to external factors shaping an outcome; the second type, cognitive, relates to the
interactions between individuals and collective perceptions; and the third type, relational,
refers to the connections and networks among individuals or groups (Tilly, 2001, 24). We
can consider mechanisms as: “a delimited class of events that change relations among the
specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations,”
while processes can be thought of as a larger combination or sequence of various mecha-
nisms (Tilly, 2001, 26). Finally, Tilly identifies a third type of mechanism— episodes—
stories of success or scandals that take on social significance and from which we often derive
shared meaning (Tilly, 2001, 26). These distinctions are very important when discussing ac-
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countability issues. They help us understand where scholars of accountability have focused
their attention. For instance, the general public’s attention is often co-opted by important
episodes in the sector, such as the United Way scandal, the post 9/11 funding of terrorist
organizations, or news about funding misappropriation. Similarly watchdog organizations
have overly emphasized tools like financial disclosure, while scholars have focused much at-
tention on the mechanisms of accountability, such as participation, delegation, or coercion
(see Grant and Keohane, 2005; Ebrahim, 2003a; Brown and Moore, 2001). These impor-
tant distinctions will guide the empirical analysis in chapter 6. By taking an actor-centered
perspective, I clarify what the most salient responses deployed by TNGO leaders are.
Leadership of accountability: Concluding remarks
While the discussion above has highlighted the importance of approaching NGO ac-
countability as constituted by various stakeholder relationships, the accountability scholar-
ship has generally failed to open the NGO “black box” to understand the role of key actors
in these relationships: the leaders of these organizations. Considering NGOs as a unitary
entity bypasses an important and unanswered question in the literature: How do TNGO
leaders understand and implement their accountability? Which practices and stakeholders
do they emphasize when making their accountability decisions, and why? It should be said
there are some notable exceptions. For instance, Fry (1995) has argued for the concept
of “felt responsibility” as a means by which leaders increase their organizational effective-
ness. In his theoretical piece, he stresses the importance of considering nonprofit leaders
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as “masters of accountability conversation” and examining their role in shaping expecta-
tions, enforcing practices, and interacting with stakeholders. Ospina et al. (2002) addressed
conceptualizations of accountability in four successful Latino identity-based nonprofit or-
ganizations and found that the leaders’ accountability conceptions were anchored in their
community relationships and that the communication with these stakeholders was key to
responsiveness, legitimacy, and a broader conception of NPO accountability (p. 28). De-
spite the study’s methodological limitations, it makes a clear attempt to link the leadership
views of accountability with their stakeholders. Knutsen and Brower (2010) studied sixteen
Chinese Canadian-based nonprofit and voluntary organizations and discussed the key role of
managers in balancing their “expressive accountability,” based on shared values, and their
“instrumental” accountability, focused on resources. They suggested that lower environmen-
tal pressures reduce the need to trade expressive for instrumental accountability and that
managers are key to maintaining a balance. While this is an important insight, like that of
Ospina et al. (2002), the emphasis on identity-based organizations introduces non-negligible
biases on the part of leaders toward value-based relationships with stakeholders. By ex-
ploring accountability perspectives across various sectors of activity, types of organizations,
and organizational characteristics, I reduce these possible biases. Lastly, Campbell (2002)
explores the role of nonprofit leadership in the paradox he observes:
“If they [the leaders] focus only on the project-level outcomes over which they have the
most control or for which indicators are readily available, they risk default on the larger
question of accountability to publicly valued goals. On the other hand, if they try to
demonstrate the impact of their particular projects on community wide outcomes, they
risk taking credit inappropriately or shouldering the blame for indicators beyond their
control” (p.243).
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His solution hinges on the ability of nonprofit managers to develop a clear causality chain,
increase collaboration with goal-oriented funders, and foster community leadership, in order
to critically assess data and outcomes, and maintain discipline (Campbell, 2002, 255). As I
will show in the empirical analysis, this paradox persists and is complicated by the impor-
tance of principled ideas about what accountability is, and by the broad range of stakeholders
TNGOs face.
These studies show the potential contributions of this research project, which inno-
vates methodologically by expanding the study of accountability across a range of operational
contexts. I expand the building of theoretical accountability frameworks beyond the study
of domestic nonprofits, and to do so, I integrate simultaneously all the core questions related
to accountability. By understanding the relational nature of TNGO accountability, one can
compare and contrast how the leaders of these organizations perceive their accountability
audience and the strategies they deem important to implementing accountability. Determin-
ing what accountability is, and to whom TNGO leaders feel they ought to be accountable,
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Investigating TNGOs: Opportunities and challenges
The study of TNGOs is complicated by three important factors. As noted in chapter 2,
perspectives on NGO accountability stem from various disciplines. Discipline-specific biases
can create insular discussions and thus hinder progress in the theorization of accountabil-
ity. Furthermore, I have discussed the complexity of studying TNGO accountability, given
the concept’s contested definitions and the difficulties involved in generating a consensual
definition. The research strategies I discuss in this chapter address an important challenge
facing TNGO research, one that concerns the availability of reliable and comparable data
for a large number of cases and the use of suitable methodological tools for managing and
analyzing the data.
Since qualitative evidence drawn from interviews or from an organization’s archives is
widely used to make claims regarding the activities of NGOs, I propose two complementary
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and innovative strategies for systematically analyzing interview data: interpretative content
analysis and qualitative pattern analysis. These analytical strategies are needed, since the
management and systematic analysis of large amounts of data can lead to great inefficiencies
of resource management, data “preservation,” and life span over multiple projects, as well as
general research costs. This is especially true for NGO scholars interested in making compar-
isons across a wide set of cases or organizations and/or across countries. Data management
and systematic analytical methods are a crucial yet under-discussed aspect of qualitative
research, and the research strategies in this chapter contribute to these discussions.
Organization of the chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. I first present the Moynihan Transnational NGO
Initiative1 and discuss the methodology behind the project. In the second section, I discuss
the questions that were addressed in this research project and the variables used to compare
respondents’ operating environments. I also provide an overview of the coding schemes used
in the Moynihan Transnational NGO Initiative and the distribution of answers for this ini-
tial coding. These tables are presented in greater detail in Schmitz et al. (2012). I discuss
the importance of a qualitative and inductive approach to the data and explain the qual-
itative data analysis (QDA) software, Atlas.TI, used for this project; the iterative coding
process; and the details of coding decisions made specifically for the project. I then focus
1The research for this project is partly supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-0527679
(Agents of Change: Transnational NGOs as Agents of Change: Toward Understanding Their Governance,
Leadership, and Effectiveness) and the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs.
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on the coding transformations used and explain the rationale behind these choices. I de-
tail my iterative approach and the use of interpretative content analysis (Hesse-Biber, 2010;
Krippendorff, 2013; Mayring, 2000), the methodology I relied on to qualitatively and quan-
titatively analyze the data on accountability. I also introduce a complementary approach,
which I callqualitative pattern analysis, an adaptation ofsequence analysis (Abbott, 1995). I
used this technique on the frequency data from the qualitative database. I explain how this
qualitative pattern analysis was used to create independent categorical variables for testing
the level of association between certain relevant variables.
The Moynihan Transnational NGO Initiative:
Data and strategies
The interdisciplinary team of the Moynihan Transnational NGO Initiative2 designed
the study to address three main gaps in the literature. First, a lack of cross-sectoral and
large-scale studies limits researchers’ capacity to make empirically sustained generalizations;
second, disciplinary divides have fragmented and inhibited research programs connected to
transnational NGOs; lastly, leadership perspectives have rarely been linked explicitly with
organizations’ attributes (Hermann et al., 2010b, 4). ‘Elite’ interviews offer an actor-centered
perspective that provides a rich and contextualized understanding of governance issues; it is
also well-suited to augmenting response validity, as respondents are given the opportunity
2I was part of the core research team from June 2007 to September 2012. I was involved in the development
of the codebook, the coding, and some research publications stemming from the project (see Schmitz et al.,
2012, Summer 2011; Hermann et al., 2010a,b).
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to explain their thought process in greater details(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Aberbach
et al., 1975; Tansey, 2007).
Sampling
Respondents were sampled of the Charity Navigator database3 in 2005. From 3,500
organizations in the database, 334 NGOs engaged in transnational/international activities—
activities that extend at least into one other country—and furnished complete financial
information. Excluded from the population were organizations considered to be religious
entities, hospitals, and institutions of higher learning. The research team conducted 152
semi-structured in-depth interviews with leaders in the organizations from this sample pop-
ulation.4 Eighty-one percent of respondents were the highest-ranking executives in their
organizations, 12% were vice-presidents or second in command while 7% were the next high-
est ranking officer available for an interview. The sample was selected to be representative of
the population in regard to organizational attributes such as organizational size, the sector of
activity, and financial health. The population and sample details are presented in Table 3.1.
Variables
In this research project, I define operational context broadly to include the sector
of activity as well as the financial resources of the organization. I use several variables to
operationalize this context and study the variations in accountability views. The variable
3See http://www.charitynavigator.org.
4The response rate of the original sample made from the population was 67.8%.
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Table 3.1: Study sample characteristics
Institutional Characteristics Sample Population
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
n=152 (%) N=334 (%)
Budget size
Small (less than 1,000,000 USD) 56 36.8 132 39.5
Medium (1,000,000 to 10,000,000 USD ) 64 42.1 135 40.4
Large (more 10,000,000 USD) 32 21.1 67 20.1
Efficiency
Low (1 and 2 stars) 35 23.0 77 23.1
High (3 and 4 stars) 117 77.0 257 77.0
Capacity
Low (1 and 2 stars) 57 37.5 130 38.9
High (3 and 4 stars) 95 62.5 204 61.1
Fiscal health
Low efficiency & low capacity 22 14.5 40 12.0
High efficiency & low capacity 13 8.6 38 11.4
Low efficiency & high capacity 35 23.0 90 27.0
High efficiency & high capacity 82 54.0 166 49.7
Sector
Environment 22 14.5 49 14.7
Human Rights 21 13.8 48 14.4
Humanitarian Relief 32 21.1 69 20.7
Development 64 42.1 141 42.2





*Not originally used to stratify the sample.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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organizational size was designed as a measure of the TNGO’s operational budget, where
small was a budget smaller than one million dollars, medium was a budget ranging between
one and ten million dollars, and large was a budget over ten million dollars. The sample
included organizations involved in five sectors of activity : 14.5% of organizations were envi-
ronmental NGOs, almost 13.8% were human rights advocacy NGOs, 21.1% were involved in
humanitarian relief, 42.1% were devoted to sustainable development and, finally, 8.6% were
involved in conflict resolution. The variable financial health was based on the scores and star
rating system used by the Charity Navigator index. These made up a composite measure
based on financial data from the four previous fiscal years.5 Financial efficiency—the ratio
of non-program spending versus program spending—and financial capacity—a measure of
financial stability measuring revenue growth and cash reserves—were provided by Charity
Navigator. Two categories were created: low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars), in
order to facilitate the comparison across organizations. Lastly, organizations were divided
by their main activity: advocacy, service or both. An organization was considered an advo-
cacy organization if its main purpose was to promote a specific agenda without explicitly
delivering goods and services to their target populations. An organization was considered an
advocacy organization if its main purpose was to promote a specific agenda without explic-
itly delivering goods and services to its target population. An organization was considered
a service organization if it mainly sought to deliver goods and services to a specific target
population. If an organization explicitly mentioned both types of activity, it was classified
5The financial information from the organizations included in the Charity Navigator dataset is based
on annual tax returns or IRS Forms 990. Filing these forms is mandatory in the U.S. in order to obtain
non-profit 501(c)(3) fiscal status.
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as doing both.
Interviews
The use of open-ended interviews was desirable for helping researchers understand
inductively how people involved in TNGOs think about different issues. Open-ended in-
terviews also foster the sound operationalization of such concepts, should they be used for
quantitative analysis further down the line. To maximize response rates and candid answers,
all respondents and their organizations were granted anonymity. Interviews averaged eighty
pages of transcript and about 1.5 hours of conversation. These in-depth interviews were con-
ducted between the summer of 2006 and spring 2008. Respondents were asked open-ended
questions regarding their governance, goals and strategies, effectiveness, communication, col-
laboration, partnership, leadership, and accountability. My research primarily focuses on the
questions about accountability. Each interview was transcribed verbatim and interviewers
were asked to include debriefing notes for each interviews. The full interview protocol can
be found in appendix.
Qualitative Data Analysis: Using Altas.TI
While open-ended interviews can be useful for defining concepts and overcoming prob-
lems with web or mail-in response rates (see Hager et al., 2003; Lin and Van Ryzin, 2012),,
depending on their structure and length, the systematic analysis of such long interviews
can be not only tedious but also problematic. One of the key criticisms that qualitative
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researchers face is whether they correctly describe patterns in the answers or project their
perceptions of what the patterns might be? Qualitative data analysis (QDA) software has
emerged as a potential solution to help in systemizing the analysis of qualitative data. These
technical developments, along with the increasing digitalization of NGOs and the accessi-
bility of electronic documentation, have made data management easier but also potentially
overwhelming. QDAs also offer a possible solution for replicability issues that critics have
lamented in qualitative research (King et al., 1994; Mayring, 2000). Recent efforts by fund-
ing agencies have stressed the importance of data management, as well as the dissemination
and sharing of research data and results.6
Instead of relying on a complicated system of notes or an elaborate excel spreadsheet
to keep track of interesting quotations, new QDA software such as NVivo7 or Atlas.TI8 has
allowed researchers across epistemological “allegiances” to manage their data and effectively
retrieve evidence on which to base their claims. These software applications, like large
library catalogues, enable the creation of a customized database for organizing data. Also,
they enable the manual and/or automated coding of themes or other information deemed
relevant by the researcher within each document uploaded into the custom database. QDA
software simplifies the analysis of themes across multiple entries, the retrieval of quotations,
and the use of data over time.
6The National Science Foundation for example now requires a data management plan as of 2011, avail-
able at: http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf11001/aag_6.jsp#VID4 [last accessed on
March 28, 2013].
7For more information on the software see: http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx
[last accessed on March 30, 2013].
8For more information on the software see http://www.atlasti.com/index.html [last accessed on March
30, 2013].
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Accountability
Figure 3.1: Uses of qualitative data analysis softwares
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish the possible uses of QDA software along
an inductive/deductive dimension and an automated/manual dimension (see Figure 3.1).
The inductive approaches favor organically building the codebook or theme structure as one
goes through the collected data. Generally, this type of use leans toward theory-building
projects. Deductive approaches, however, adopt a pre-determined codebook, where themes
are derived from theories to be tested on the evidence collected. QDA software is a relatively
epistemologically neutral tool, as it is designed to support evidence retrieval. QDA tools can
be used to classify evidence automatically by performing structured word queries determined
by researchers or by highlighting the recurrence of certain words in the text.
This dissertation project was designed to follow an exploratory sequential approach
as suggested by Creswell (2013). This two-phased research design is well-suited for theory-
building and mixed-method research projects such as this. Creswell (2013) notes that the
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initial phase is characterized by the collection and the analysis of qualitative data, while the
second phase focuses on the analysis of quantitative data drawn from the initial research
phase. This incremental approach enabled me to explore and analyze in the second phase
the phenomena and patterns observed in the first phase. I took a more inductive and manual
approach, as illustrated by figure 3.1. QDA software can be used manually, as it was here,
to classify text under meaningful categories.
The first phase of my research project on accountability favored an inductive approach
to the evidence; categories were created following an iterative process described in figure
3.2 and refined after further analysis of the data. I relied solely on the manual capacities
of Atlas.TI to make my inferences and descriptions, as my evidence was not computer-
generated. This allowed me to consider the context in which each application of a code was
made. I relied on conceptual maps, as shown in figure 4.1 (p.71) in chapter 4 for example
to present interrelated groups of codes and illustrative quotations. Novak (1990) and Eppler
(2006) suggest relying on conceptual maps to illustrate the core concepts found in qualitative
data. In the second phase of the project, I used quantitative analysis to understand the
associations between patterns of answers and the leaders’ operating environments.
Coding: Moynihan TNGO Initiative
Three types of codes can be used for “elite” interviewing: (1) manifest coding items,
which involve direct responses to questions, mostly involving ordinal level data, (2) latent
coding items, where themes are inductively or deductively inferred from the respondents’
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answers, and (3) global coding items, where interviews are assessed as a whole, and a coder
is asked to make specific judgments about the respondents (Aberbach et al., 1975, 11-15).
The team of principal investigators developed a codebook, using insights from the
literature on transnational NGOs. A team of five coders tested the initial codes on out-of-
sample interviews. The same team of diverse9 coders (less one) was involved throughout the
process illustrated in figure 3.2. The first codebook involved mostly manifest coding items
and some latent coding items. While an initial coding phase was intended to familiarize
coders with the conceptual categories to be used, it eventually helped with aligning the
meaning of each code, determining the proper amount of text to highlight for each quotation,
and creating new codes for themes emerging from the data. The iterative process described
in figure 3.2 produced important refinements of the codebook and the development of new
reliability tools. One of these tools was an error checking script that was used to flag
omissions or potential contradictions. Mayring (2000) argues that these iterative coding
procedures are suitable for the systematic development of codes applicable to open-ended
interviews.
Once this out-of-sample process was finalized, the 152 interviews were all coded using
the same finalized version of a qualitative codebook containing 413 dichotomous codes, where
0 signaled the absence of a specific theme and 1 its presence. About 10% of the interviews
were coded twice and the overall intercoder agreement score was 80%. 10 Atlas.TI 5.6 was
9I was one of the coders involved throughout the process. Our group included graduate students from
various ethnic origins, gender and field of study.
10For a detailed description of how intercoder rates were calculated please see Hermann et al. (2010a,
19-26).
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Adapted from Mayring 2000, 11.a
Figure 3.2: Moynihan TNGO Initiative: Iterative coding process
used to archive the data from the interviews, as well as to produce a frequency dataset of
the codes applied for each interview. These codes were used to transform and merge some
overlapping themes and guide some of the analyses of the qualitative evidence.
Research questions
As I discussed in chapter 2, this study addresses the core questions of TNGO ac-
countability: What is TNGO accountability? Accountable to whom? Accountable how?
Furthermore, it considers the variations of accountability views across sectors of activity
(environment, human rights, humanitarian relief, development, and conflict resolution) to
42
Chapter 3: Research Design and Data Collection
understand how the context of operation affects accountability views and practices in the
TNGO community. In this section, I discuss the questions I used from the Moynihan TNGO
initiative, as well as my research strategies for analyzing the data.
In the interview project, respondents were asked several open-ended questions, as
listed in Table 3.2. This section of the interview had the highest response rate, as all of the
respondents in the sample offered an answer to at least one question. Response rates varied
for each question, as respondents sometimes answered questions without actually providing
substantive or meaningful answers.
Table 3.2: Questions Relating to Accountability
Questions on Accountability
Q1. How does your organization define accountability?
Q2. To whom or what do you perceive your organization is account-
able?
Q3. What strategies or activities does your organization use to
strengthen its accountability?
Q4. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is low and 5 is high, to what degree
are you satisfied with what your organization is doing regarding
accountability? Would you please explain your rating?
Protocol Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
I present in table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, the Moynihan TNGO themes and illustrative
quotations. One of the main reasons that I recoded the original qualitative dataset was
to avoid overlapping themes and to explore the residual category labeled as ‘others’. In
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effect, as I will show in the later chapters, many of these residual quotations offered insights
particularly regarding the definitions of accountability and the strategies to implement it.
Coding Decisions and Data Transformation
In this section, I explain chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 coding decisions and data transforma-
tion procedures based on the qualitative and quantitative dataset provided by the Moynihan
TNGO. The recoding decisions relating to chapters 4, 5, 6 were based on the transformation
of the original codes contained in the Moynihan TNGO quantitative dataset.11, I have also
recoded the residual category “others” into the newly defined codes. For chapter 7, I used
a more inductive approach as themes and related discussions emerged from my analysis of
the data.
For this project, I used a binarized version of the frequency data produced by Atlas.TI
for each organization in order to reduce potential biases, as my interest lay in comparing
organizations. By simply binarizing the frequency data to indicate whether the leader of an
organization mentioned the code or not, I reduced the noise produced by respondents who
were particularly verbose during the interviews, compared to those who offered very succinct
answers. I also addressed potential problems via over-coding or under-coding by the coders.
If I were to do an in-depth case study of each organization, the raw frequency data (the
number of times one code was applied in one interview) would be better suited, since they
provide individual-level information about the relative salience of a particular code for one
11The dataset for replication is available at https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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specific respondent.
Chapter 4—Definition: What is accountability?
As explained above, once the larger coding project was completed, the codebook
was not changed, to enable systematic coding by all coders. During the out-of-sample code
formation process, coders noticed that several answers were not clearly classifiable according
to the categories that were first established by the principal investigators, and thus were
placed in the residual category “others.” 4 relies on the quantitative and qualitative outputs
for the codes shown in Table 3.312.
I explain in chapter 4 that scholars have tried to understand whether the motivations
behind NGOs’ actions are derived from their principles, values, and identities, or from their
materialistic interests (Büthe et al., 2012). Furthermore, scholars have suggested that the
uncertainty of TNGOs’ operating environments creates important tensions between their
principled views and materialistic interests, which in turn leads to dysfunctional organi-
zational outcomes (Cooley and Ron, 2002).I have used the idea of these two competing
worldviews to understand how these seemingly competing drivers of action shape leaders’
understanding of what accountability is. To do so, I surveyed the qualitative outputs as-
sociated with the definition of accountability—446 quotations for the definitions alone?and
recoded several variables originally included in the dataset. As my coding proceeded, I
noticed the presence of an emerging category of definitions that were focused neither on
12For the complete codebook, see appendix C, 195.
48
Chapter 3: Research Design and Data Collection
principles of accountability nor materialistic motives. I labeled this third emerging category
regulative, since the quotations from the respondents emphasized the regulative structures
(both formal and informal) related to accountability. For example, I recoded the v5024
definition as disclosure/transparency and created three dummy variables for transparency:
v5024a (material), v5024b (principles/values) and v5024c (regulative). I then recoded the 88
quotations recorded under transparency (originally code v5024 in the dataset) and assigned
them as either material, principled or regulative. To finish the recoding of that section, I
reclassified the quotations labeled under v5025 (other definitions of accountability). While
this was a tedious process, it was important to do it; I reviewed all 73 quotations in this cat-
egory, 16.4% of quotations for the section on definitions of accountability. Adopting broader
categories eliminated the need for “residual” categories.13 I then proceeded to analyze the
qualitative content of each new code (principled, material, and regulative definitions) to
understand how respondents characterized each set of understandings about accountability.
Chapter 5—Audience: Accountable to Whom?
This section contained an aggregate of 706 quotations filed in Atlas.TI. When I an-
alyzed the answers on accountable to whom?, I recoded 38 quotations included under the
theme ‘other stakeholders’, a total of 25% of responses in that section (see table 3.4). I
found that five ‘other’ groups emerged aside from the most common ones mentioned: (1)
God/Higher Power, (2) Experts, (3) Watchdog/ Standard-setting organizations, (4) Media
13All the transformations are available in a series of Stata do files that are available in upon request. The
frequency dataset is publicly available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/.
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and (5) Self. These are some helpful examples of the necessity to recode the other cate-
gory. Some respondents declared their accountability to God or a Higher Power: “[...]well
first, we operate like we are accountable to God.” Second group included Experts and Spe-
cialists or Professional Associations: “So environmental professionals, [...]. we fell broadly
that those are the people that we serve and to whom our work is directed so they can im-
prove our environment.” Third, respondents also mentioned Watchdogs or Standard-setting
organizations: “We are also accountable to these Watchdog groups.” Coders did not have
a clear code referring to this type of stakeholders in the final codebook they were given.
Watchdog organizations’ role is to rate or assess organizations (voluntarily or not) whereas
experts where issue specialists whose mission is to provide resources and information. Few
respondents mentioned, being accountable to the media and lastly, other respondents men-
tioned being accountable to themselves “And the fourth level of accountability I would say
is to ourselves”. The remaining quotations were duplicate quotations. I have merged two
themes similar to government accountability— accountable to host governments (v5044) and
accountable to charter governments(v5045) as I found that leaders did not offer a clear and
consistent distinction between the two. I have excluded the theme ‘Accountable to Mis-
sion’ from my analysis as I have captured this discussion in the discussion of definitions to
accountability. In this section, I was interested in the stakeholder relationships instead of
their broad conceptions of accountability. I have merged codes referring to the environment
and higher entities such as ‘God’ as the main idea here was to capture the broad a diffuse
stakeholder.
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I explain in chapter 5 how Najam’s (1996) framework helped transform the data to
produce a simplified analysis. There is a trade-off between coding all possible mentions and
creating broader conceptual categories for descriptive statistics. In my analysis, I incor-
porated both strategies. Therefore, donors, boards, and governments were included under
accountability to patrons, beneficiaries under clients and the rest under accountability to
self.
Chapter 6—Response: Accountable how?
The Moynihan TNGO Initiative dataset first included ten codes associated with the
question: “What strategies or activities does your organization use to strengthen its account-
ability?” (see table 3.5) for a total of 650 quotations analyzed. I integrated the residual
category Other means of accountability– code v5070– (34.9% of respondents) into other ap-
propriate categories. I created one additional category Training, improving & qualified staff.
For instance, a respondent’s answer to the question was : “Right, we select our partners
carefully and manage our partners carefully. Because they’re the ones that deliver the pro-
gram, that follow up, we continue to invest in the training materials and methods we have
so that we can deliver people the best possible training”. Another respondent mentioned on
a similar line of thought : “We’re always changing the systems to try to get better reporting,
better accounting, making it easier, less time consuming. We just try to get better at all of
those things with new software, with new hardware, with training. Folks go for trainings in
different things a lot”. Both these answers were subsequently classified under the new theme
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Training, improving & qualified staff.
Furthermore, when analyzing the original quotations, I decided to merge some codes
that seemed to have some overlap with other ones. This was the case for the theme of
Evaluation & auditing which encompassed Policies–v5061– and Agreements–v5069, for the
category Disclosure, communication & transparency, a product of code v5066– Public dis-
closure– and v5067– Reporting to the board. Moreover, codes v5068–Consultation– and code
v5065– Meetings were combined under Discussions and consultations. Finally, I merged the
original code v5061–Policies– and code v5069–Agreements to produce Codes and standards.
Here is a concrete example. The original code v5061– Policies contained clear quotations
that could be classified under it: “ We have, we have pretty standard and fairly strict policies
in place, I wouldn’t say they were informal at all, and standard bookkeeping and financial
practices, you know we follow all that to the letter with our annual audit and our policies
and procedures, so I would say from a very technical aspect I’m pleased with it with internal
accountability controls, and you know two signatures needed on anything financial and um
the chair of the board checks on the, you know signs of on my expenses and those kinds
of things so it’s not like I can do what I want but they can’t”. Some quotations contained
under the original code v5069– Agreements– contained quotations that were a little more
ambiguous such as: “Well, from our grantees, they sign a grant agreement before they get
any money. This is also, I think, required for public charities to do this” . In this case, the
coder was first correct to label this answer as pertaining to agreements and contracts but
it could have also been argued that the respondent referred to code v5061– Policies– when
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mentioning the requirements for public charities. To avoid such ambiguities, I decided to
merge both codes contained in the original dataset and create a new, more encompassing
theme, which I called Codes & standards.
Chapter 7—Thinking critically about accountability: A TNGO leadership view
This chapter is the most exploratory of this research project, as no codes were initially
created in the TNGO dataset, other than broad qualitative codes labeling the answers. I read
through 179 quotations, which captured lengthy critical reflections about each respondent’s
accountability performance. Respondents commented on their own accountability and gave
insightful comments about the reasons they generally did not do as well as they would have
hoped to. Inductively, I found three broad challenges (conceptual, governance, and financial).
I went through all the answers once, then, the second time around I organized the answers
based on their main focus. While I expected discussions on the conceptual challenges, on
which the literature has extensively focused (see chapter 2, I found two other predominant
challenges and a potential solution through the amelioration of communication strategies for
accountability purposes.
Limitations and Opportunities
This project provides unprecedented data on how leaders of transnational NGOs reg-
istered in the U.S. view the world in which they operate. It allows a re- searcher to gather
base-line descriptive data across sectors of activity to understand how these views vary across
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sectors of activity and between different type of organizations. While the advantages are con-
siderable, there are some limitations to the data, notably issues regarding how some financial
information was operationalized, and regarding matters of generalizability, replicability, and
causality.
It is first important to note that some limitations, such as the operationalization of
quantitative variables, and reproducibility, are complicated by the fact that the respondents
were granted full anonymity. Given the small number of transnational NGOs in the Charity
Navigator sample, the principal investigators raised concerns that respondents could be
identified by the demographic and organizational data. For this reason, secondary data have
been mostly operationalized into nominal or ordinal level variables. Therefore, this limits
the range of statistical analysis to be used on this type of data. For the purpose of this
research, chi-square tests of independence were suitable, since the codes for each answer
were not mutually exclusive, and they represent the frequency with which each code was
applied across the interviews. While these can be important drawbacks, the anonymity
allowed us to have unprecedented access to the leaders of these organizations, who can often
be unwilling to discuss candidly the struggles they face when managing their organizations.
A possible bias in the analysis could be introduced by the way the variable organi-
zational size was operationalized. Nonprofit studies have inconsistently measured organiza-
tional size using occasionally ordinal variables, 1=less than $250,000 to 7= over $10 millions
(see Brown, 2005, 319) or as a continuous variable (Guo and Acar, 2005). The main issue
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with this variable is about how small organizations (less than one million USD) were ini-
tially coded. This is particularly salient for nonprofit studies devoted mostly to domestic
nonprofits. Since small organizations include all organizations operating with less than one
million dollars, it can represent a significant portion of the U.S. nonprofit sector. It is es-
timated that almost three quarters of the registered 501(c)(3) declared less than $100,000
in gross receipts in 2010 but represented only about 3% of total public charity expenditures
(Blackwood et al., 2012, 3). Moreover, 85% of all registered public charities expenditures are
accounted by a small portion of organizations (4%) mainly because these numbers include
hospitals and universities (Blackwood et al., 2012, 3). The variable was operationalized to
reflect the spread of international NGOs which can be different than domestic NGOs. At the
time the Charity Navigator database included only organizations that filed 990 tax forms
declaring at least $25,000 in gross receipts. Studies interested in the international NGO
sector have suggested to classify NGOs’ budget size similarly to what was adopted by the
Moynihan TNGO Initiative (see Salm, 1999, 89). Contrarily to general estimates of the
U.S. nonprofit section, over 60% of Charity Navigator’s population of transnational NGOs
reported budgets of over one million dollars (see Table 3.1). Lastly, one could make the
assumption that it requires a minimal amount of resources to operate transnationally much
greater than the resources needed to solely operate within one country.
Some could also raise generalizability concerns regarding the representativeness of
the sample of transnational NGOs. The sample represents Charity Navigator’s popula-
tion of transnational NGOs as of 2005. Whether Charity Navigator’s population is closely
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representative of the broader U.S. registered TNGO population has yet to be determined
empirically. At the time the sampling was done, Charity Navigator provided the only com-
plete database available. This database was compiled using nonprofit tax return information
reported in the 990s tax forms, and thus excluded nonprofits not required to file 990 tax
forms because they reported less than $25,000 a year and those who simply did not file tax
forms. Therefore, when I refer to “TNGOs” in this project, I can confidently discuss results
in comparison with the Charity Navigator population only. Though this is an important
limitation, the benefits of having systematic in-depth data from a wide number of organi-
zations outweigh some concerns and enable me to offer research propositions that can be
further tested empirically.
As mentioned earlier, respondents were granted anonymity. Therefore, transcribed
interviews cannot widely circulate, as respondents often made statements that can reveal
the identity of their organization. Most important, reproducibility is an issue because of
the large amount of qualitative data. Because of the extensive resources needed to code
the open-ended answers, reproducing this large endeavor is not theoretically impossible,
but in practice extremely unlikely. This is an important but not uncommon challenge of
analyzing large amounts of qualitative data. The use of qualitative data analysis software
such as Atlas.TI allows researchers to systematize the evidence and make evidence retrieval
possible.
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Analytical Strategy: Interpretative Content Analysis
Since one of the goals of my project is to study the variations of leadership views
about accountability, an important part of my project is dedicated to descriptive inferences.
I use a QDA, Atlas.TI, to support an interpretative content analysis strategy (see Seale, 2004,
372). This approach is particularly relevant for making descriptive inferences and engaging
in concept formation. This approach to data analysis is located between traditional content
analysis of textual data which focuses on the frequencies of specific words and patterns, and
discourse analysis, which tends to focus on speech and the ways in which themes are depicted
or absent from prevalent narratives (Ahuvia, 2001; Hesse-Biber, 2010; Krippendorff, 2013).
Since the analysis of documents highly depends on the information ‘tagged’ for making
inferences, the interpretative component of content analysis becomes essential to correctly
contextualize the data. Similarly to what I have shown in Figure 3.2, the data analysis
process is also an iterative process. As the qualitative data are analyzed, the researcher
must assess whether the codes first used are the most efficient way to summarize the data
and whether new codes emerge from analyzing the data. For example, as I was analyzing
the data, I became increasingly interested in how respondents characterized their critiques of
question 4. (see Table 3.2). From their answers regarding their ratings, I coded for the various
challenges and obstacles respondents faced when implementing their accountability. An
important thing to remember is the inferential limits of this type of data. The data extracted
from qualitative data analysis software inform us only about the presence or absence of a
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particular code. If a particular code is applied, researchers can have access to the quotations
associated with the code. Therefore, using such quantitative output (frequency data) must be
done with caution and must be complemented with qualitative examples. The “quantizing”
of qualitative data raises crucial epistemological and methodological questions for inference
validity if the analysis relies on assumptions that cannot be met by open-ended data (Hesse-
Biber, 2010, 80). This is particularly true when using open-ended interview data, common
practice for NGO scholars, as opposed to survey data, where researchers impose specific
views on how concepts are defined.
While interpretative content analysis is a suitable approach to studying how account-
ability views vary across sectors of activity and different types of organizations, it only pro-
vides information on what leaders of TNGOs answered in response to the questions asked
and any other information they volunteered. However, if one is interested in systemati-
cally studying variations and patterns in accountability views, complementary approaches
are needed to give information on how respondents answered each question, i.e. the com-
bination of these various attributes and holistic type of answers. While the practice of
reporting frequency counts is widespread and generally adequate, I argue that more can be
done to analyze qualitative interview data, because this can help us gain a more nuanced
and meaningful understanding of respondents’ answers.
58
Chapter 3: Research Design and Data Collection
Complementary analysis strategies
To analyze the variations, I relied on contingency tables and chi-square tests of in-
dependence to assess whether an association could be found between the answers leaders
gave and their operating environments. The extensive dependence on nominal-level vari-
ables limits the range of possible statistical tools one can use with confidence on the data.
Furthermore, given the open-ended nature of the answers, respondents often touched on
several themes simultaneously in their answers. In other words, the attributes were not
independent of one another, as responses varied tremendously. Since none of the variables
was strictly continuous, other types of analysis, such as ANOVA tests, would not have been
applicable. Furthermore, logistic regression analyses were limited because of the relatively
small number of cases created for each variable, as well as the assumption of independence
between attributes. It is important to proceed cautiously with statistical analysis of this
type of data. Given that the data were extracted from frequency counts of open-ended data
and that the expected counts for some categories were particularly small, statistical signifi-
cance should be looked at as an indication of a potential relationship. Lastly, ascribing the
arbitrary 0.05 level of statistical significance is perhaps also too restrictive, considering the
type of data. The empirical chapters all include results that showed a statistically significant
association up to the 0.15 level. Since the goal of my research is theory building, testing for
such associations enabled me to offer several propositions for further testing by empirical
research.
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Given the varying level of complexity expressed by respondents for each question, it
was important to introduce a complementary approach to analyze answers. I use a modified
version of Sequence Analysis (SA) which I refer to as qualitative pattern analysis (QPA)
to understand the patterns in the answers. QPA was used for each empirical chapter to
understand the recurrence of most common answers. Again, QPA allows us to go beyond
‘what respondents answered’ but provide a better picture of ‘how’ they actually answered
each question, often offering nuanced statements in each case. For example, while many
respondents mentioned being accountable to donors, they also mentioned other stakeholders
in the same answers. QPA allows me to map the most common combinations. If the sample
size would permit, QPA offers the potential of using multinomial logistic regression analysis,
as each pattern does not violate the assumed independence between attributes.
SA has been used in many fields to describe, understand, and analyze meaningful com-
binations of attributes contributing to a general phenomenon (Abbott, 1995; Brzinsky-Fay
et al., 2006). Brzinsky-Fay et al. (2006) describe a sequence as “an ordered list of elements,
where an element can be a certain status (e.g., employment or marital status), a physical
object (e.g., base pair of DNA, protein, or enzyme), or an event (e.g., a dance step or bird
call)” (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006, 435). If researchers were to study each attribute separately,
they would only gather an incomplete picture and mischaracterize the general phenomenon
they seek to explore. This approach allows a holistic and systematic analysis of qualitative
data. Sequence analysis has produced interesting developments in fields such as psychology,
where sequences are important for understanding cognition and development; in economics
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and marketing studies, where theories of choice and consumer preferences present various
sequences to be analyzed; in archeology, where time and spatial sequences of artifacts are of
particular interest to understand how society lived; in political science and sociology, where
scholars developed ‘stage’ theories relying on sequence analysis (Abbott, 1995, p. 96-103).
Such analysis method can provide an efficient and systematic way to analyze qualitative data
and allows the development of categorical variables or index variables. Recent developments
in sequence analysis have allowed researchers to perform it relatively easily using tools de-
veloped in Stata by Brzinsky-Fay et al. (2006). A well-known approach to studying patterns
in non-continuous data has been latent class analysis, but often there are some important
statistical disadvantages to using this analysis, especially for sample sizes below 300 cases
(see Yang, 2006). Furthermore, latent class analysis tends to underestimate the number of
latent classes present in a sample holding all else constant (Yang, 2006, 1098).
Coding for all the possible combination of attributes for each question would be not
only tedious but greatly inefficient. As I show in chapter 4 for example, respondents offered
three types of definitions that I categorized as material-M, principled-P, and regulative-R.
Assuming the ordering of the attributes does not offer added analytical leverage, respondents
could potential mention all three attributes, two, one or none as shown by: {M-P-R, M-P,
M-R, P-R, M, P, R, ∅}. Some respondents could have answered the accountability question
by solely discussing their stakeholders or the means they used to be accountable; thus, the
possibility of not discussing accountability. The number Nn of all possible combinations
produced by n possible attributes is given by the following equation when ordering is not
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Because we defined three possible category there are height possible solutions for the
question: “How does your organization define accountability?” The solution for the equation
shows that possible combinations increase exponentially with the number of possible choices.
For example, the solution for Q.1 is N3 = 8. The solution for Q.2 “To whom or to what do
you perceive your organization is accountable?” is N5 = 32 and N5 = 32. for Q.3 “What
strategies or activities does your organization use to strengthen its accountability?”
Table 3.6: Sequence Analysis Properties
Properties
Recurrence Dependence
A combination of attributes, i.e. a
sequence, is repeated or not in the
sample.
Attributes of sequences are a function
of other attributes and thus sensitive
to ordering.
Interdependence Causality
An event or attribute occurring in one
sequence, prevents it of occurring in
others.
Depending on the research question(s),
sequences can be independent/input or
dependent/outcome variables.
Adapted from (Abbott, 1995, p. 95-96)
Abbott (1995) reviews the literature on sequence analysis and discusses four main
property of sequences (see table 3.6), notably: (1) recurrence , (2) dependence, (3) inter-
dependence, and (4) causality (Abbott, 1995, 95–96). Researchers and academic disciplines
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have assigned varying degrees of importance to these properties, depending on the research
question(s) at hand (Abbott, 1995). These properties can guide researchers in selecting ap-
propriate aspects to stress in their analysis. I highlight the recurrence of sequences in the
answers in this research project, as I do not assume that the ordering of attributes matters
in the respondents’ answers.
Concluding remarks
Few studies have directly addressed the issue of transnational accountability; there
have mostly been single-case studies that have focused largely on accounts of beneficiary
empowerment (see Ebrahim and Weisband, 2007; Garsten and Boström, 2008). Scholars
interested in transnational accountability have not systematically investigated accountability
views and practices across operational contexts and thus have been unable to offer a deeper
understanding of how and why accountability is conceptualized and practiced as it is in
global governance14.
The study of NGOs’ governance issues such as accountability also raises important
analytical and empirical challenges. Analytically, there is no clear consensus on many core
issues connected to NGO governance and investigations are plagued by important disci-
plinary divides. These divisions foster disciplinary myopia on a subject that extends beyond
academic boundaries. Empirically, the lack of consistent and comparable data on NGOs’
14Global governance can be defined as “the maintenance of collective order, the achievement of collective
goals, and the collective processes of rule through which order and goals are sought” (Rosenau, 2006, 164).
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activities stems from the costs for both researchers, in gathering the data, and organizations,
in helping researchers with their projects. NGOs have limited resources allotted for research
activities, and given the slow nature of academic research, returns on investments for TNGOs
(time devoted to researchers) are not an incentive for participation. It is therefore crucial
that scholars invest in strategies to maximize the use of amassed data to avoid “research
fatigue” from NGOs. I hope to contribute not only to the theorization of accountability, but







Organization of the chapter
As I explained in chapter 2,a core question in accountability debates is how it is
defined. In this chapter, I explore the leaders’ answer to the question “how does your orga-
nization define accountability?” and show that TNGO leaders do not frame accountability
in terms of trade-offs between their principled ideas and material incentives. Instead, they
take a complementary, a nuanced and more strategic approach to accountability.
IIn the first part of this chapter, I present the frequency counts of key themes from
the transcribed and manually coded interviews and use interpretative content analysis to
discuss the answers. This chapter distinguishes itself from Schmitz et al. (2012) approach in
important ways. First, I address the issue of residual categories originally labelled as others,
and thus explain the variations in descriptive statistics. Second, after carefully considering
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the qualitative content of each code originally in the Moynihan TNGO qualitative dataset,
I found it necessary to merge some ambiguous codes to focus the analysis. A detailed
description of these transformations is available in chapter 3.
I took the systematic analysis a step further by using qualitative pattern analysis
(QPA) to explore how the themes mentioned by the leaders combined to form patterns in
their answers. As I explained in chapter 3, I use qualitative pattern analysis to explore not
only what respondents answered but more important how they answered the core question
addressed in this chapter: what is accountability? When analyzing the association between
a leader’s operating environment and his or her views on accountability, I present only
statistically significant results, at the 0.15 level or less. I end this chapter by offering summary
definitions of accountability from the leaders’ perspectives.
Definition
Scholars have struggled to understand whether the motivations behind NGOs’ actions
are derived from their principles, values, and identities, or from their materialistic interests
(Büthe et al., 2012). While a first wave of scholars mostly stressed their principled mo-
tivations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), later discussions have emphasized the false dichotomy
between principled ideas and material interests in explaining NGOs’ behaviors (Pishchikova,
2006). distinguished between two key dimensions of accountability definitions, which they
understand to be “based upon a tension between the instrumental, resource-seeking, and
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practical dimension of the organization versus the expressive, value-oriented, and resource-
consuming dimension” (p. 590). They suggest that non-profit and voluntary organizations
will adopt a more balanced view, relying on both conceptions, as opposed to other organiza-
tions (Knutsen and Brower, 2010, 590). They also propose, regarding the leadership role in
these organizations, that a balanced “style” that relies on both instrumental and expressive
accountabilities is key to managing multiple accountabilities and is more important than or-
ganizational characteristics (Knutsen and Brower, 2010, 606). As I will show in the following
sections, I find some evidence to support their propositions. While a balanced position was
indeed predominant, the range of answers suggested a greater diversity than they advance.
It would be reductive not to consider other factors that contribute to the variations observed
in the data, such as sector- and activity-related variables.
Furthermore, scholars have suggested that uncertainty in TNGOs’ operating envi-
ronments creates important tensions between their principled views and materialistic inter-
ests, which in turn leads to dysfunctional organizational outcomes(Cooley and Ron, 2002).
Pishchikova (2006) distinguishes between an ideational approach to NGO and TNGO inter-
actions and a materialist one driven by material interests and operational constraints, but
concludes that “[T]ransnational NGOs will perceive different tools and strategies as legit-
imate and/or effective depending on the context and the issue.” (Pishchikova, 2006, 55).
None of these debates, how- ever, has explored more closely the motivations of the actors
themselves; rather, they infer motivations from the actors’ behaviors. By looking at con-
ceptualizations of accountability along these broad frameworks (ideational and materialist),
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I aim to understand what motivations drive their accountability. Keeping these two broad
frames in mind, I classified each answer as conveying a principled definition of account-
ability or a materialistic one. However, as I was classifying each answer, I noticed that
several discussions referred to neither frame, but rather emphasized the regulative aspects of
accountability. I therefore created a third category, which I labeled regulative definitions.
My analysis of the TNGO Initiative data suggests that there are three broad types
of accountability definitions: Material definitions, mentioned by 75.0% of respondents;
principle-oriented definitions, mentioned by 59.2% of respondents; and regulative definitions
discussed by 21.1% of respondents (see table 4.1). Material definitions include discussions
relating to the financial resources associated with accountability. Principled definitions ex-
plicitly discuss values, morals and ethical aspects of ‘being accountable’ while regulative
definitions refer to comments about the mandatory procedures associated with accountabil-
ity such as discussions about disclosure and transparency imposed by others or by laws.
The first two types of conceptualization that I found to emerge from the data about
definitions of accountability (material and principled) appear to juxtapose two approaches
to accountability. The first type,material, highlights how the leaders of transnational NGOs
attend to their donors and their resources in their accountability considerations. The second
type, principledshows the importance of values and morality in accountability discussions. I
will later show that this contrast is more nuanced that this table initially suggested. How-
ever, the emergence of a third type of definition adds to this traditional binary debate: the
68
Chapter 4: Definitions: What is Accountability?
Table 4.1: Definitions of Accountability








aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
relevance of externally imposed constraints on private actors’ behavior. Although this third
type of definition is not as prevalent in the leaders’ answers as the two others, the lack of
emphasis on the regulative aspects of accountability by leaders of TNGOs is interesting in
several ways. While the international relations scholarship has paid more and more attention
to the increased diffusion of codes of conduct and the emergence of private policy making
and sustainable standards of corporate responsibility in global governance, the management
literature has predominantly studied the impact of codes of conduct and standards on orga-
nizational performance, for accountability purposes (see Sloan, 2009). However, both fields
have neglected to understand how these standards are diffused within organizations, paying
more attention to the global diffusion of standards on one hand and to their implementation
on the other. My analysis is an important first step in the study of the boundaries between
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global and internal governance. These data show that leaders of TNGOs have their own
views about what accountability means and that they do not perceive themselves to be con-
strained or influenced by codes and standards of accountability in the formal sense. This
could be a product of institutional myopia, because their accountability “vision” is mainly
geared toward organizational needs and missions instead of toward the context in which they
operate. This highlights the importance of this research in understanding the relationship
between context and accountability. In the following sections, I explain in greater detail each
of these accountability conceptualizations.
Material definitions of accountability
When discussing their views about accountability, a large share of respondents (75.0%)
framed at least part of their answers in material terms. More specifically respondents dis-
cussed the management (1) of their resources, the importance of transparent communication
(2) about the use of funds, and the importance of directly linking funds with tangible re-
sults (3). One respondent clearly put it: “I would say certainly accountability often follows
money.” Figure 4.1 presents the three main frames and sub-types identified by respondents.
In managerial terms, respondents defined accountability as the good stewardship of
resources often entrusted to them by donors. As the example illustrates in figure 4.1, re-
spondents often defined ‘being accountable’ as protecting donors’ investments and interests.
For example, a respondent notes that to be accountable is “trying to spend the maximum
number of dollars on program and not on administration .” Likewise, another respondent
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Managerial
Communication Result-Based
"Just having good governance and good 
management that protects the donors funding as an 




"I think in terms of overall accountability, 
letting people know where their money is 
going, and certainly documenting the work 
that we do both through our news updates 
and everything else."
"When you spend money, you want 
to know what the result is"
Figure 4.1: Material conception of accountability.
71
Chapter 4: Definitions: What is Accountability?
said “[accountability is] how we manage our donor’s money and transparency in how we
make decisions.” Respondents’ answers classified under this theme directly and explicitly
linked resources and management. In these various conceptions of accountability, respon-
dents referred explicitly to an “accountability role,” by which they sought the fulfillment of
donors’ interests. This type of emphasis is consistent with the scholarship suggesting that we
should consider accountability relationships using a principal-agent framework. In contrast,
the other two characterizations (principled and regulative) do not always explicitly refer to
a specific stakeholder and more often to an abstract ideal. This makes the adoption of a
principal-agent framework for understanding TNGO accountability problematic, as it does
not offer a full and precise picture of what accountability is for leaders of TNGOs.
In their definitions, respondents also routinely discussed the importance of communi-
cation for accountability purposes. As I explained in chapter 2, this is an important yet under
discussed aspect of accountability. Leaders often defined what accountability meant in their
organization by referring to the importance of communicating and documenting the use of
resources. While in more managerial views respondents emphasized the internal governance
of accountability, in communication-oriented answers, the leaders of TNGOs emphasized the
importance of “knowledge” about the use of funds and “sharing” this information appropri-
ately. For instance, when defining the concept, one leader offered the following: “I mean
anybody that wants to take a look at us we want to be as transparent as possible and show
them how we’re using their money.” Another leader, when defining accountability, discussed
the importance of communicating with donors:
72
Chapter 4: Definitions: What is Accountability?
By communicating with our donors as to what we’re doing and the kind of work that
we are doing, giving them examples of the kind of social change that we can create
(Human Rights Leader).
While this last respondent discussed broadly the social impact of the organization, she/he
directly addressed the need to communicate with donors according to her/his conception of
accountability. The disclosure of information is limited not only to the use of funds, but also
to the substantive impact of the organization. However, as I will explain later, the leaders of
TNGOs face important challenges in efficiently communicating their accountability beyond
financial disclosure.
The last type of material conception of accountability involved a direct link between
funds and tangible results. However, this was a relatively less favored characterization than
the two previous ones. A respondent answered: “Well accountability means ultimately that
you use the money for the purpose for which the donors intended for it to be used.” This is
what Kearns (1996) described as “outcome accountability”. He defines it as:
[A]nother type of accountability focuses on the outcomes produced by public and non-
profit organizations. Did the services reach their intended beneficiaries? What benefits
were achieved by these services in relation to their costs?... Kearns (1996, 30).
However, limiting accountability to its impact not only oversimplifies the concept, but also
implies that the purpose is clearly established and that the results can be clearly assessed.
As I discuss in chapter 7, this is perhaps the greatest challenge leaders of TNGOs actually
face.
Furthermore, I found that there are two distinct, but not necessarily opposed, ways
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in which respondents discussed the “results” of their organization. When using material
definitions of accountability, respondents clearly linked results and achievements with the use
of resources for their intended purpose. In this view of accountability, means (i.e., resources)
were emphasized. When discussing principled views of accountability, respondents defined
accountability as the achievement of their broad goals or the fulfillment of their mission,
without making a direct connection to the use of resources to achieve these. Their emphasis
was on the end instead of the means.
Principled definitions of accountability
TNGO leaders also defined accountability in principled terms (59.2% of respondents).
This leader described well this other side of accountability:
And so getting completely out of the head of finance and administration side of things
and into the moral side of things, I think as an organization, we have very clear values
and we are a mission driven organization. Our mission is to empower women and end
poverty so I think we feel a very strong sense of accountability to do right in the world
by those values (Human Rights Leader).
As a leader expressed it (see 4.2), there is an understanding of accountability be-
yond the realm of financial accountability, which involves an organization’s core principles.
This is an important reminder that leaders’ motivations are not solely based on material
interests, but are also firmly rooted in ethical and moral narratives. Constructivist schol-
ars have consistently argued that identities, norms, and principles shape states’ and NGOs’
behavior(Checkel, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Hurd, 2008; Klotz, 1999). Empirical
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evidence seems to suggest that principled discourses in aid NGOs can drive their resource
allocation decisions(Büthe et al., 2012). Thus, it is not surprising to find an important
principled component to definitions of accountability.
First, respondents emphasized the abstract fulfillment of their missions and goals.
They stressed the importance of the ideals and goals of the organization in fulfilling their
accountability duties. For instance, one respondent noted that: “we define accountability
as accountable to our strategic plan.” This emphasis on the missions and goals does not
preclude respondents from being strategic, but highlights how the organizing principles and
goals of an organization are key for accountability purposes. Reducing accountability to
simply the finances of the organization would mischaracterize what TNGO accountability is
perceived to be. Another leader stated:
we take the issue of accountability to being that we do have to show that we’re not only
reaching people but that we’re changing their lives for the better, that we’re creating
sustainable systems that create sustainable change, lasting change for people (Relief
Organization Leader).
An interesting aspect of principled views of accountability is the notion of long-term ac-
countability (ends over means) where as in material views of accountability described a
more short-term vision (means over ends) of what accountability is.
Second, leaders whose answers were categorized as principled discussed accountabil-
ity in normative terms. Being “accountable” for many respondents is an inherently norma-
tive endeavor in itself. Their answers were framed using words such as truthful, honesty,
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Values & Aspirations
"Just having good governance and good 
management that protects the donors funding as an 
investment on their part."
Communication
I would say it's getting down to the things we say are 
going to get done to achieve getting them done, 
making them, very strong, some of those things are 
aspirational, but I see it as like a promise, you know? 
Our promise is that we're going to make, that we're 
going to work hard, our darnest (sic) towards these 
goals and objectives. And to me, accountability is 




Figure 4.2: Principled conception of accountability
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integrity, moral and values. While in their material discussions of accountability, their dis-
cussion focused on the act of disclosure, in definitions that have been labeled as principled,
respondents made an implicit distinction between the quantity of information disclosed and
what they considered most important, its quality. This distinction parallels Fox (2007) claim
that there is an important difference between types of transparency (clear and opaque), and
Fox’s warning against the assumption that more transparency is better.
Regulative definitions of accountability
Finally, a third type of definitions emerged from the interviews which I labeled reg-
ulative. For example, a respondent noted: “I think that one has accountability to legal
structures, first” This lack of emphasis on the standards and codes of conduct shaping ac-
countability views—expressed by only 21.1% of respondents—is surprising, given the empha-
sis on ratings and disclosure in the media. This also suggests that elites in TNGOs have not
internalized these standards in their accountability views, but, as I show in chapters 6 and
7, they have implemented accountability responses and communication strategies commonly
promoted by these standards. This discrepancy suggests a disconnect between leadership
perceptions and implementation, and thus offers new directions for further studies.
In this type of definition, respondents specifically emphasized respect for laws and
standards of conduct. Contrary to the two previous conceptualizations, respondents de-
scribed the formal rules (laws) and informal standards established by rating agencies that
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Bylaws, codes of conducts Institutional practices, habits.
Figure 4.3: Regulative dimensions of accountability
they felt defined their accountability. The following respondent emphasized the disclosure of
funds, but did so in the context of upholding the laws and standards placed on organizations.
Often, the disclosure aims to satisfy stakeholders beyond donors. For example:
[T]he IRS requires a 990, so our accountability is to the world, not just donors, not just
partners, but it’s to anybody on planet earth. The law requires our 990 to be available
and it is posted on the internet on Charity Watch and all of the other charity oversight
(Development Leader)
When extending accountability beyond the donors of an organization, in practice, the in-
formation disclosed might not be relevant to other stakeholders, again emphasizing that
compliance with standards does not necessarily equate with accountability.1
1Fox (2007) made a similar argument regarding the relationship between transparency and accountability.
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The leaders’ answers framed as regulative understandings of accountability empha-
sized two dimensions of accountability. A formal/informal dimension and an external/internal
requirements. Figure 1 summarizes these two dimensions. Leaders emphasized in their an-
swers certain formal aspects of accountability, such as the laws or bylaws they had to abide
by on one hand, and ratings such as those of Charity Navigator and their institutional prac-
tices on the other. The other regulative expressed by the leaders involved external or internal
requirements. Leaders discussed the legal requirements constraining their accountability ac-
tions. In light of these, their actions were mainly geared toward following the disclosure
requirements set by external actors. The respondents focused on the internal aspects of
regulative accountability when they described their official organizational policies and codes
of conduct, and, more informally, on their habits and “ways of doing things.”
A Complementary Approach
I used qualitative pattern analysis (QPA)2 to complement the analysis of the previ-
ous section. Thus far, I have described the attributes of what respondents answered to the
how does your organization define your accountability? In this section, I explore how these
attributes are combined, to provide a more in depth qualitative analysis of the answers. As I
explained earlier in section 1, TNGO leaders discussed accountability in three different ways
which I labelled material, principled, and regulative. Since they were asked open-ended ques-
tions, the leaders did not limit their discussion to one specific aspect of accountability (only
2I describe the approach in details in chapter 3, section 1 (page 59).
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Table 4.2: Distribution of patterns: what is accountability




Material & Principled 44 31.4 31.4
Material 39 27.9 59.3
Principled 24 17.1 76.4
Material, Principled & Regulative 21 15.0 91.4
Material & Regulative 10 7.1 98.5
Regulative 1 0.7 99.2
Principled & Regulative 1 0.8 100.0
aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
55.7% did so). Indeed, 44.3% of leaders expressed their accountability in a very balanced
and complementary way suggesting that only a minority of leaders view their accountability
in very narrow and monolithic terms.
The initial QPA of the answers to question 1– how does your organization define
accountability? revealed the presence of the eight possible patterns. Table 4.2 describes
each pattern found in the answers.
Of the observed patterns of answers, the four most important sequences made up
91.4% of all the observations. Only three types of sequences did not include material views
of accountability, where respondents discussed only principled or regulative aspects of ac-
countability and which represented less than 9% of all observations. While a large majority
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of the TNGO leaders addressed some material aspects of accountability in their definitions
(75%), only 27.9% of respondents focused solely on that aspect of accountability, whereas
all others who offered an answer expressed either more nuanced views about accountability
or did not mention material aspects of accountability at all. The most common response
pattern (31.4%) is more nuanced than the initial analysis of the frequencies would suggest.
TNGO leaders, when conceptualizing what accountability is in the context of their organiza-
tion, referred to both material and principled dimensions. For example, a leader expressed
this nuance very clearly: “[We have a] moral obligation to do with that money as efficiently
as we can what we said we’d do with that money.” This suggests, not a dichotomous re-
lationship between both conceptualizations, but rather a complementary one. Comments
were rarely only about the use of funds; they were often also about the moral duty to use
them wisely. As for regulative definitions, these were not a recurrent element in the patterns,
since respondents rarely offered them. This lack of salience of regulative aspects of TNGOs
is quite surprising, given that most of these TNGO leaders had to respect clear legal, if not
community-based, standards to operate domestically and transnationally. In the following
section, I examine how accountability definitions vary across operational contexts.
Does operational context matters?
In the second part of this chapter, I analyze how the leaders’ accountability views, and
the patterns I previously discussed, vary across operation contexts3 I analyze the associations
3I have discussed these variables in more details in chapter 3, section 1.
81
Chapter 4: Definitions: What is Accountability?
between (1) organizational size, financial health (capacity and efficiency), the sector of oper-
ation, and an organization’s main activity and (2) the leaders’ definitions of accountability.
I present only statistically significant associations below the 0.15 level.
Financial health
The data do not suggest a statistically significant association between the financial
health of an organization and the definitions of accountability discussed by its leaders. This
suggests that scholars cannot presume that the financial vulnerability of an organization will
lead to types of accountability that are focused on the management of financial resources.
Service vs advocacy leaders
I found two types of definitions offered by the leaders that were significantly associated
with the type of activity an organization carried out. I present a summary of the finding
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. As I mentioned in section 1, the most common response pattern
(31.4% of respondents) was the simultaneous inclusion of material and principled aspects
of accountability when defining accountability. When looking more closely at the leaders
who described accountability in these more nuanced terms, I found that few (18.8%) of the
leaders of advocacy organizations expressed such a nuanced view of accountability, whereas
a greater proportion of service-oriented leaders (40.9%) defined accountability by balancing
its material and principled aspects, and so did leaders engaged in both type of activity
(26.2%). This suggests two things. First, that the leaders of service-oriented TNGOs view
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accountability in more complex ways than their peers, suggesting that service requires more
complex models of accountability than other type of activity. This is an important first step
in acknowledging that the activities a TNGO engages in must be matched with relevant
accountability structures.
Second, advocacy activity should not be reduced to the preaching of principled ideas.
To the contrary, these leaders are perhaps most oriented to securing the financial needs of
the organization, instead of implementing the principles they advocate, through their daily
activities as service-oriented leaders. As I show in Table 4.4, it is the leaders of advocacy
organizations (34.4%) and the leaders of service/advocacy organizations (35.7%) that focus
in greater proportion solely on the material aspects of accountability. Only 19.7% of all
the leaders of service-oriented organizations defined their accountability solely in material
terms.
Sector of activity
I found that 15% of the leaders expressed the most complex views about account-
ability by describing it in material, principled, and regulative terms simultaneously. Among
these leaders, I found that 25% of the leaders of environmental TNGOs, 21.1% of the leaders
of human rights organizations, and 18.6% of the leaders from sustainable development NGOs
expressed a complex understanding of accountability. It is particularly in the environmental
and human rights sectors that formal laws and informal codes of conduct have developed.
This suggests that these leaders are aware of the complex environment in which they operate
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Table 4.3: Main activity by definition (%)
Definition: Material & Principleda
Activity Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Advocacy 27.1 13.6 22.9
(26) (6) (32)
Service 40.7 61.4 47.1
(39) (27) (66)
Both 32.3 25.0 30.0
(31) (11) (42)
% 100 100 100
(n) (96) (44) (140)
Chi2(2)=5.67; ρ=0.06
a Percentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Table 4.4: Main activity by definition (%)
Definition: Materiala
Activity Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Advocacy 20.8 28.2 22.9
(21) (11) (32)
Service 40.7 61.4 47.1
(53) (13) (66)
Both 32.3 25.0 30.0
(27) (15) (42)
% 100 100 100
(n) (101) (39) (140)
Chi2(2)=4.15; ρ=0.125
a Percentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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and are incorporating this complexity into their accountability discussions. One could argue
that these two sectors rely heavily on principled ideas to promote their activities. However,
as I have shown previously, the leaders of advocacy organizations, which, presumably, are
more inclined to rely on principled ideas, tend to focus on material understandings of ac-
countability and be less nuanced than the leaders of service-oriented TNGOs. This suggests
that the issues with which they engage require different accountability models, and thus,
that they should be explored separately from other sectors of activity.
In comparison, only one respondent out of thirty (3.3%) from relief TNGOs, and
no leader from a conflict resolution TNGO, described accountability in these terms. It is
worth noting that, overall, only one leader of a conflict resolution organization mentioned
some regulative aspect of accountability when defining it. This is interesting, given that a
lot of the work associated with conflict resolution organizations often involves some form of
formal international treaty or informal standards of practice. In the case of the leaders of
relief organizations, their lack of overall attention to the regulative aspects of accountability
can also be attributed to the fast-paced nature of the sectors. Often, these leaders operate
organizations that intervene in emergency situations and thus must concentrate their efforts
on putting their principles into action in a timely manner. Recent efforts have tried to offer
informal standards to foster accountability even in emergency situations (see ECBP, 2007).
However, as the data show, these efforts have yet to be internalized by the leaders of these
types of organization.
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Table 4.5: Sector of Activity by definition (%)
Definition: Material, Principled & Regulativea
Sector Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Environment 12.6 23.8 14.3
(15) (5) (20)
Human Rights 12.6 19.1 13.6
(15) (4) (19)
Development 40.3 52.4 42.1
(48) (11) (59)
Relief 24.4 4.8 21.4
(29) (1) (30)
Conflict Resolution 10.1 0 8.6
(12) (0) (12)
% 100 100 100
(n) (119) (21) (140)
χ2=8.05; df =4 ρ=0.09
a Percentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Size
I found a strong association between the leaders of TNGOs who described a balanced
view of accountability (i.e., mentioning both material, and principled aspects of the concept)
and the size of the organizations they led. The leaders of small organizations are quite
different from their peers (see Table 4.6). Only 17.3% of them described a balanced view of
accountability, while the leaders of medium-sized TNGOs (40.4%) and nearly half (46.7%)
of the leaders of large TNGOs described accountability in balanced terms. In turn, a greater
proportion of the leaders of small TNGOs (40.4%) emphasized a material understanding of
accountability than the leaders of medium (19.0%) and large (23.3%) TNGOs (see Table
4.7).
A possible explanation is that managing larger operational budgets calls for a more
complex set of skills. Thus, the leaders of large TNGOs will express this complexity in their
understandings of accountability. The leaders of small organizations will focus on guarantee-
ing a resource-oriented type of accountability, as fluctuations in the levels of their resources
has a greater potential to undermine the survival of the organization. Pfeffer and Salan-
cik (1977) make a similar argument about the positive relationship between administrative
complexity and the size of organizations. They argue that the management of large organi-
zations, hospitals in their study, requires leaders with greater administrative expertise (80).
Similarly, I found that the leaders of large organizations have a more nuanced understanding
of organizational accountability, while the leaders of small TNGOs focus on the management
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Table 4.6: Size by definition (%)
Definition: Material & Principleda
Sizeb Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Small 44.8 20.5 37.1
(43) (9) (52)
Medium 38.5 47.7 41.4
(37) (21) (58)
Large 16.7 31.8 21.4
(16) (14) (30)
% 100 100 100
(n) (96) (44) (140)
Chi2(2)=8.66; ρ=0.01
a Percentages have been rounded.
b Where Small is >1,000,000USD, Medium is between 1,000,000
and 10,000,000USD, and Large is more than 10,000,000USD
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Table 4.7: Size by definition (%)
Definition: Materiala
Sizeb Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Small 30.7 53.9 37.1
(31) (21) (52)
Medium 46.5 28.2 41.4
(47) (11) (58)
Large 22.8 18.0 21.4
(23) (7) (30)
% 100 100 100
(n) (101) (39) (140)
χ2=6.65;df =2; ρ=0.04
a Percentages have been rounded.
b Where Small is >1,000,000USD, Medium is between 1,000,000
and 10,000,000USD, and Large is more than 10,000,000USD
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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of their financial resources and entertain less sophisticated definitions of accountability.
What is accountability? Definition
In this chapter, I have studied the answers of leaders of TNGOs to the question: how
do you define accountability in your organization? I found that leaders of TNGOs expressed
three broad types of conceptualization. A material understanding in which leaders empha-
sized managerial, communication, and result-based approaches to accountability. A princi-
pled understanding in which leaders emphasized organizational goals and missions as well as
the values and ethics of the organization. These two conceptions of accountability suggest a
temporal distinction between short-term goals in the material conception vs long-term aims
in the principled one. In other words, I found that material conceptions emphasized the
means over the end of accountability (management, disclosure, resources) while principled
understanding emphasized the end over the means (goals, values, principles). Leaders also
discussed a third type of definition suggesting a regulative understanding of accountability
by emphasizing the external and internal codes of conducts that vary in degree of formality.
However, elites in TNGOs have not generally internalized these regulative oriented standards
into their definitions (only 21.1% of mentions). I show in chapter 6 that they have imple-
mented accountability response and communication strategies commonly promoted by these
formal or informal standards. . This discrepancy suggests a disconnect between leadership
perceptions and implementation and thus offers new venues for further studies.
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The data show the salience of a material conceptualization of accountability. Indeed,
three-quarters of the leaders emphasized material aspects, more than half discussed a prin-
cipled approach, and less than a quarter mentioned regulative aspects of the definition (see
Table 4.1). However, when carefully analyzing the answer patterns, I found that the leaders
most commonly expressed a careful, nuanced definition of what accountability is, followed
by definitions that either focused solely on the material aspects of accountability or solely
on the principled aspects. Another interesting and sophisticated group of leaders discussed
all three aspects of accountability (see Table 4.2).
In regard to variations in leadership views across operational contexts, I found that
activities, the sector of operation, and size matter in different ways. Unlike their traditional
characterization as principled actors, from which one could infer a propensity to rely on
normative rhetoric to account for their activities, advocacy leaders emphasized the mate-
rial aspects of accountability in greater proportion than leaders devoted to some type of
service-oriented activity. The leaders of service-oriented TNGOs expressed a more nuanced
approach to accountability by taking a more complementary approach to it than their peers.
Regarding the sector of operation, I found notable discrepancies between sectors. The leaders
of environmental, human rights and development TNGOs offered a more complex conceptu-
alization of accountability than their peers managing relief and conflict resolution TNGOs.
This suggests that there are different accountability realities and that the issues with which
leaders engage call for a flexible understanding of accountability.
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I have shown that understandings of accountability are multiple, context- based, and
complementary and that there is no dichotomy between principled ideas about accountability
and materialistic ones. Furthermore, I have shown the emergence of a third conceptualization
that should be considered more seriously: the regulative aspects of accountability. I conclude
this chapter by offering four definitions of accountability that encompass 91.4% of all of the
definitions described by the leaders in the sample (see Table 4.2).
Balanced definition:
Accountability is the governance of organizational resources and the transparent com-
munication of outcomes. It is rooted in an organization’s values, mandate, and princi-
ples and seeks to balance short-term and long-term organizational goals.
Material definition:
Accountability is the governance of organizational resources provided by the principals
of the organization, as well as the transparent communication of outcomes. It is guided
by achieving short-term organizational goals defined by the principals’ expectations.
Principled definition:
Accountability is the achievement of the long-term goals and mandate of an organi-
zation, while consistently respecting the founding principles, values, and ethics of the
organization.
Complex definition:
Accountability is the informal and formal duty to govern organizational resources and
disseminate the outcomes of the actions of the organization transparently to all stake-
holders. Rules of appropriate behavior are imposed or adopted by the organization in
keeping with the organizing principles, values, mandates, as well as the short-term and
long-term goals of the organization.
In the following chapter, I discuss the next piece: core accountability questions re-
lating to audiences. Leaders often discussed definitions of accountability in relation to the
stakeholders they seek to satisfy. They also often conflated definitions of accountability with
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those to whom they felt accountable. This highlights not only the relational nature of the
concept of accountability in regard to audience, but also its complementarity, as both aspects





Organization of the Chapter
I have shown in the previous chapter how the leaders of TNGOs define the concept of
accountability. These definitions refer directly to the individuals or entities the leaders see
themselves being accountable to (accountable to whom? ). As Sell and Prakash (2004, 168)
noted: “ideas and normative frames cannot be examined without specifying whose interests
they serve.” “Accountable to whom?” reflects both an “active” (targets) and “reactive” (au-
dience) approach to accountability. By targets, I refer to what Kearns (1996) has labelled as
‘strategic accountability’, i.e. organizations favor an approach to accountability which will
satisfy a particular set of stakeholders. By audience, I highlight that not all definitions of ac-
countability will resonate with all stakeholders and that some understandings explicitly refer
to a specific set of stakeholders. In other words, there is a reciprocal relationship between the
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definitions and the audiences of accountability. If one understands what accountability is,
then one can determine to whom it might apply. Conversely, identifying which stakeholders
you would like to be accountable to can help you understand the operational definition of
accountability in play.
I have organized this chapter as follows. First, I discuss the various stakeholders that
constitute the “accountability audience” of a TNGO. I highlight the interactions among
various stakeholders. Second, I discuss the leaders’ answers to the question: “To whom
or what are you accountable?” I show that while most leaders’ attention is directed toward
patrons, they still navigate a very complex set of accountability demands. Third, by studying
the effects of operational contexts on leaders’ perceptions of their stakeholders, I found that
this complexity varies greatly, depending on the sector of operation as well as the level of
resources of the organization.
Audience
As I have discussed in chapter 2, Najam (1996) has discussed three types of ac-
countability interactions within a NGO: to patrons (those who provide the NGO with goods
and services), to clients (the recipients of these goods and services), and to self—“self-
accountability” (where individuals and the organization are accountable to the goals of the
organization, its staff, supporters and non-paying members).
Inexorably linked to the question of what accountability is, is the question “Account-
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able to whom?” In this section, I first give an overview of the answers to the question: “To
whom or to what do you perceive your organization is accountable?” An important note
must be made, however. As I observed in chapter 2 accountability is a social and relational
concept (see Brown, 2007), so that respondents often proposed definitions in which they
referred to which constituent they felt accountable to. Understanding to whom leaders of
TNGOs perceived themselves to be accountable explains how power is distributed in their
organizations and reveals accountability biases in TNGO organizations. A key challenge
for TNGOs and their leaders is to define the scope of accountability. The more diffuse the
boundaries of an organization become, the more stakeholders an organization can be ac-
countable for. “Accountable to whom?” is linked to definitional issues of what it means
to be accountable. Material accounts will privilege donors, whereas principled definitions
will appeal to a broader constituency, including beneficiaries and affected communities. One
respondent illustrated this link between the definition and the object of accountability:
Well, I think that NGOs are moving more towards a model that’s been prevalent in the
business world, which is that you have to be accountable to your stakeholders and [it]
really depends on how broadly you define your stakeholders. If like most business, you
define your stakeholders exclusively as shareholders, you end up using accountability
as a shield to justify all sorts of wrong behavior (Development Leader).
Indeed, if one is solely accountable to donors and the money they “invested” in the organiza-
tion, whether the activities yield meaningful results for the affected populations becomes less
relevant by that conception. If, in turn, accountability is geared toward beneficiary empow-
erment, donors become less central to the workings of the accountability system. Leaders
negotiate the tension between the need for financial survival and mission consistency.
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Contrary to the question about the definition of accountability, where I found only
three main types of definitions, respondents in this case gave a wide range of possible answers,
thereby creating a much wider range of possible patterns.1. If all of the respondents gave
different answers to the question “Accountable to whom?”, one could observe, at most, 152
unique sequences. Table 5.1 shows an interesting distribution and concentration of answers.
Among the 152 observed sequences, I found only 82 different answer patterns. While this
is too broad to describe efficiently, it is interesting to note that fifteen of these 82 patterns
accounted for almost half of the observations (46.7%), and of these, the top eight patterns
accounted for 32.9% of all of the observations.
I present in table 5.2 the most recurrent response patterns, which made up 32.9% of
all observations. The most common response pattern when asked accountable to whom was
the combined mention of donors and beneficiaries (10 respondents).
Of the 119 mentions of donors reported earlier, only nine respondents focused solely
on donors without adding another stakeholder to whom they were accountable. This sug-
gests that restricting accountability relationships to being accountable to donors would be
misleading at best and potentially very detrimental for TNGOs at large. The central im-
portance of other stakeholders such as beneficiaries, partners and board members suggests
that the leaders of TNGOs focus on a core set of constituents more systematically than
others. While some leaders in the sample perceived themselves as engaged in very complex
accountability relationships and designated many constituents, most respondents, in fact,
1Potentially 8192 unique patterns of answers.
98
Chapter 5: Audience: Accountable to Whom?
Table 5.1: Common Patterns of Stakeholder Mentions










aPercentages have been rounded.
bThese are referred to as unique sequences or patterns.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Table 5.2: Common Patterns of Stakeholder Mentions : Accountable to Whom
Description of the pattern Frequency Percentage of patternsa Cum. percentage
Donors & Beneficiaries 10 6.6 6.6
Donors 9 5.9 12.5
Board, Donors & Beneficiaries 7 4.6 17.1
Board & Donors 6 4.0 21.1
Board, Donors, Beneficiaries & Partners 6 4.0 25.0
Staff, Donors & Beneficiaries 4 2.6 27.6
Board & Donors, Partners 4 2.6 30.3
Board, Staff, Donors & Beneficiaries 4 2.6 32.9
aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
focused on a few core constituents. The next step for practitioners is to form systems of
accountability to respond at least to these core relationships.
A complementary approach: Priority stakeholders
Using Najam (1996) three groups of stakeholders, I analyzed the distribution of lead-
ers’ answers, using Venn diagrams to illustrate the possible patterns of answers. This strategy
is effective for highlighting the overlapping stakeholders to whom leaders of TNGOs perceive
themselves to be accountable. Of the 149 leaders who provided answers to this question,
almost all of them discussed being accountable to their patrons (97.3%) at some level. A
respondent from a human rights organization noted:
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You know in terms of our mission, our effort is to help build a sustainable society in
the world, and in terms of accountability for achieving that message or that mission
it’s both to our board members, donors, the governments, and individual supporters.
They provide a level of feedback, are you really accomplishing what you need to?
(Environmental Leader).
Interestingly, this leader does not mention beneficiaries, which are the central reason the
organization these leaders are “in business” to begin with.
Figure 1 highlights the need for further analysis. The qualitative pattern analysis
showed that while all of the leaders put much overall emphasis on their accountability to
their patrons (97.3%), their accountability relationships were more nuanced that the initial
analysis suggested. In all, 25.5% of leaders mentioned being accountable to all of their
stakeholders simultaneously. An equal number discussed their accountability to patrons
and self/peers, while 22.8% emphasized their dual accountability to patrons and clients.
Interestingly, only four leaders did not mention being accountable to their patrons, and
of these four leaders, only two exclusively discussed their accountability to clients. This
lack of emphasis can appear surprising at first, as leaders of TNGOs are often accused
of overemphasizing their ideals and their beneficiaries to garner support for their cause.
However, this is not the case in this sample of leaders. Almost all expressed a balanced
accountability to all of their stakeholders. This nuanced view stresses the importance of an
adaptive and holistic understanding of what accountability is and of its various interrelated
elements.
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Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at: 
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
Figure 5.1: Accountable to whom? Adapting Najam’s stakeholder framework
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Does Operational Context Matters?
In this section, I focus my discussion on the statistical significant2 relationships I
foundamong the types of stakeholders emphasized by leaders in their answers, and on their
operational contexts. The interest here lies in understanding whether there is an association
between the types of stakeholder they discuss and the types of environment in which they
operate.
Financial Health
Of the leaders that emphasized their accountability to patrons, 21.4% managed a
low-efficiency organization (i.e., their ratio between program and administrative expenses),
while 78.6% operated a high-efficiency one. Some of the data collected regarding their views
on the challenges to accountability suggest a possible explanation. Because by definition a
TNGO cannot exist without its donors (either institutional or private), it is not surprising
that the leaders’ answers reflect their centrality. Furthermore, this distribution of answers
mirrors closely the sample proportions.
Service vs Advocacy Leaders
If we compare leaders from service-oriented organizations to those of advocacy ones,
the leaders who mentioned being accountable to their peers and to themselves were engaged
in greater proportion to some kind of service delivery activity (70.5%), while the rest 29.5%
2At the 0.15 level.
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Table 5.3: Financial Efficiency by Accountable to Patrons (%)
Patrons
Financial Not Mentioned Total
Efficiency Mentioned
Low 57.1 21.4 23.0
High 42.9 78.6 77.0
% of Respondents 100.0 100.0 100.0
n (7) (145) (152)
χ2 = 4.82; df = 1; ρ < 0.05
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
were devoted only to advocacy activities. Although this could suggest that the leaders of
service delivery organization rely more on horizontal networks of accountability relationships,
the difference in proportions within the sample is not significant. This could warrant further
in-depth analysis to understand if these tendencies still hold.
Sector of Activity
I found a statistical association between leaders who mentioned being accountable
to their clients and the types of sectors in which they operate. Environmental leaders and
conflict resolution leaders discussed beneficiaries in smaller proportions than leaders from
other sectors. This difference in proportions with the original sample, while statistically
significant at the 0.10 level for environmental leaders, was not statistically significant for
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Table 5.4: Main Activity by Accountable to Self/Peers (%)
Self/Peers
Main Not Mentioned Total
Activity Mentioned
Advocacy 14.9 29.5 22.4
Service 51.4 41.0 46.1
Both 33.8 29.5 31.6
% of Respondents 100.0 100.0 100.0
n (74) (78) (152)
χ2 = 4.73; df = 2; ρ < 0.10
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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leaders in other sectors of activity. In other words, environmental leaders did not focus as
much on their beneficiaries as the other leaders did. This can explained be in part by the
“diffuse” nature of their beneficiaries. This raises a question about the type of accountability
system that might be best suited for this type of organization, given the priority placed on
other types of stakeholders other than beneficiaries. The recent push for more participative
models must be balanced with the daily practices of TNGOs and the constraints imposed
by the issues they engage with.
Table 5.5: Sector of Activity by Accountability to Clients (%)
Accountability to Clientsa
Sector Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Environment 22.1 6.7 14.5
Human Rights 13.0 14.7 13.8
Development 35.1 49.3 42.1
Relief 19.5 22.7 21.1
Conflict Resolution 10.4 6.7 8.6
Total % 100 100 100
(n) (77) (75) (152)
χ2=8.05; df =4 ; ρ=0.09
a Percentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Size
TNGO leaders must manage organizations with varying levels of resources. The
leaders discussed their accountability to patrons in proportions similar to those of the original
sample (see Table 5.6). All of the leaders from large TNGOs mentioned being accountable
to patrons. Of the few leaders who did not, five were from small organizations and the rest
from mid-sized organizations. The propensity of leaders of large organizations to discuss
their patrons can be explained by the self-reinforcing dynamic between patrons, who provide
resources to organizations, and leaders, who manage these resources. The more resources
one manages, the more interactions with patrons one will have (either formal or informal).
This proposition should be further explored in greater depth.
Table 5.6: Budget Size by Accountable to Patrons (%)
Patrons
Budget Not Mentioned Total
Size Mentioned
Small 71.4 35.2 36.8
Medium 28.6 42.8 42.1
Large 0.0 22.1 21.1
% of Respondents 100.0 100.0 100.0
n (7) (145) (152)
χ2 = 4.25; df = 2; ρ = 0.12
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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To understand whether the difference in proportions was significantly different from
proportions in the original sample, I conducted a one-sided test. Of the leaders who men-
tioned being accountable to their clients (see Table 5.7), a greater proportion where operating
small and mid-sized organizations rather than large ones. Only 34.7% of those who men-
tioned clients in their answers were from mid-sized organizations.3 comparatively to 38.7 %
from small organizations and only 26.7%4 from large organizations. The difference between
the responses of leaders of small and larger organizations warrants more attention, in order
to understand how the management of various levels of resources is associated to having a
focus on beneficiaries/clients.
Table 5.7: Budget Size by Accountable to Clients (%)
Clients
Budget Not Mentioned Total
Size Mentioned
Small 35.1 38.7 36.8
Medium 48.4 34.7 42.1
Large 15.6 26.7 21.1
% of Respondents 100 100 100
n (77) (75) (152)
χ2 = 4.30; df = 2; ρ = 0.11
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
3The difference in proportions for a one-sided test is ρ = 0.14.
4One-sided test, ρ = 0.17 .
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Accountable to whom? Audience
In this chapter, the audience of accountability. I have shown that despite a great
emphasis on donors and patrons by leaders of TNGOs, this emphasis does not accurately
describe the various accountability relationships at play within a TNGO. I have shown,
using Najam’s (1996) framework and qualitative pattern analysis, that in actuality leaders
present a more balanced view of their accountability relationships. As I present in figure 1,
TNGO leaders in this sample engage in the most complex type of accountability relationships.
Indeed, the most recurrent answer pattern to the question ‘to whom are you accountable to? ’
is mentioning all three groups or the combination of patrons and peers/self. This nuance
highlights the importance of donors and resource providers to the leaders of TNGOs, but also
challenges the assertion that leaders are primarily interested in satisfying donors’ demands
for accountability. This then should prompt scholars and practitioners to step away from
uniform financial models of accountability, which run the risk of excluding several important
accountability relationships.
I have also shown in this chapter the need for further investigation of the relationship
between operational context and accountability. I found an association between financial
efficiency and the types of stakeholders the leaders of TNGOs focused on. However, it is not
clear whether managing a more efficient organization according to standards often imposed
by patrons and peers strengthens a focus on accountability to patrons, including donors,
or whether other mechanisms are at play. Further research is needed to understand this
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dynamic. Perhaps the most intriguing finding is related to the sector of activity and the size
of an organization. Environmental leaders distinguished themselves from leaders operating in
other sectors because of their lack of emphasis on accountability to clients. This suggests that
the type of issue addressed by an organization, or the field in which it operates, constrains its
ability to be accountable to all stakeholders. This lack of attention can be attributed to the
“diffuseness” of the stakeholders of environmental organizations and prompts the question of
whether one can really have a “one-size-fits-all” accountability approach. By understanding
accountability as a set of interconnected pieces, one can recognize that the leaders of TNGOs
care differently about their stakeholders and that variations in the pattern are associated
with the sectors of activity. Finally, I found that all large organizations attend largely to
their patrons, and much less to their clients. Again, this warrants further exploration to
understand whether the infrastructures needed to manage large amounts of money distance
the leaders of these organizations from the people they claim to represent. With the recent
emphasis on participatory models of accountability, it is important to recognize that the
type of organization will affect accountability relationships.
Lastly, here is a summary of the research propositions in need of further exploration
that emerged from my analysis in this chapter.
◦ Management demands and standards originating from the patrons of an organization
will have an effect on the financial health of the organization.
◦ The issue or sector of activity of a TNGO constrains the type of stakeholders with
whom it can engage in its accountability relationships.
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◦ There is a self-reinforcing effect as the leaders of large organizations attend more to
stakeholders that will provide them with more resources (patrons), as opposed to the
leaders of small organizations.
◦ The more complex an organization is, the less its leaders will emphasize their account-




The third basic question that one should answer to understand TNGO accountability
is linked to the ways in which TNGO leaders implement their accountability. In the previous
chapters, I have discussed the definition and the audience of TNGO accountability. As I
noted discussed in chapter 2, practitioners in the sector have a wide range of tools and
processes they can use to implement their conceptions of accountability and respond to the
stakeholders making demands. This includes answers to the question: “Accountable how?”
As I will discuss in chapter 7, implementation is not without its challenges, as TNGO leaders
struggle to match their definition and their audience to the suitable response and suffer what
Carman (2010) described as “target confusion”.
Organization of the Chapter
I have organized this chapter as follows. First, I explore how TNGOs leaders respond
to accountability demands by presenting data from the interviews. Second, I explore how
112
Chapter 6: Response: Accountable how?
the operational context is related to these various responses to accountability.
Response
In this section, I present the distribution of answers to the question: “What strate-
gies or activities does your organization use to strengthen its accountability?” Respondents
discussed the implementation of accountability in their organizations in different ways. I
present in Table 6.1 the general distribution of answers.
Table 6.1: How does your organization strengthen its accountability?





Evaluation & Auditing 111 73.0
Disclosure & Transparency 75 49.3
Consultation 59 38.8
Codes & Standards 55 36.2
Training & Learning 9 5.9
aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
TNGO leaders most often mentioned evaluation and auditing (73.0%) as their pre-
ferred response strategy. Answers classified under that theme referred to regular audits such
as monthly visits to the field. An environmental leader noted: “We’ve hired outside eval-
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uators - that’s a scary thing to do, but it’s important.” Another respondent stressed the
importance and the uneasiness of an independent evaluation:
one of the things that has been very important to me is to have truly independent
evaluators and I prepare my board for this. The first time around I said, you know
if we went to a consultant, we could get a wonderful evaluation but I don’t think you
could trust it because they’d want to be, you know they’d want a return engagement.
Um, but if I had a cantankerous professor, they’re going to, you know they’re going to
give us maybe a C+. I just want you to be prepared that we’ve asked for the review,
and that the endorsement we’ll put [it] on our website (Environmental Leader) .
As the respondent noted, evaluations do not always yield pleasing results, and the organiza-
tion and its board must be prepared for, and open to, this outcome. The same environmental
leader later added:
we’ll, we’ll see what happens in this next round. But I think to hire an external
independent evaluation is one of the best ways to get accurate review as opposed to
the false precision of measuring benchmarks that are listed simply because they’re
easily measurable when conservation and international activities are so fraught and
complex, and different in different countries .
Respondents noted the challenges of conducting a meaningful assessment:
USAid puts you through a more formal monitoring and evaluation process where you
identify indicators and provide that sort of accountability. I am a little bit more cynical
of that stuff. I think you go through the motions and show what is there, provides
some proof, but I think what we try [is] to link people to what we are doing, our
donors to what we are doing in a more subjective way so they know what we’re doing
(Environmental Leader).
The second, and most often discussed, response to accountability is disclosure and
overall transparency (49.3%). About the importance of transparency, another environmental
leader noted:
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transparency was a word we kept talking about to make this [accountability] as a
strategy. I mentioned earlier, I was being critical of fair-trades websites, I don’t think
it’s too transparent. We’ve taken great pains to be extremely transparent in our
website, as part of that, as part of our strategy overall .
Another important strategy is linked to participative approaches to accountability. Of
the respondents, 38.8% mentioned adopting some form of consultation with their stakeholders
as part of their accountability process. A leader operating a conflict resolution TNGO stated,
as part of their evaluation strategy:
we try to build in measures of evaluation in every project and you know it’s like
these conferences, we’ll have questionnaires and ask people to anonymously fill out the
questionnaires and give it to me back. On the roundtable we have constant feedback
from participants because they help set the agenda. They help with invite the people
and so it’s not a big distance between the funders, the people who keep us alive and
the output (Conflict Resolution Leader). .
This respondent’s answer describes why it is important to include stakeholder feedback in
their accountability responses. Ultimately, as the leader noted, it is stakeholders who set
(or perhaps should set) the agenda for an organization claiming to act on their behalf. This
exemplifies the need for a diversity of strategies congenial to a broad range of stakeholders.
While one type of response to accountability demands, such as disclosure and transparency,
might satisfy donors, other stakeholders’ needs could be met by participatory strategies,
which are not as tangible as disclosing financials.
The fourth strategy consisted of adopting codes of conduct and external standards
(36.2% of respondents). Respondents often referred to rating agencies, as this brief exchange
with the interviewer illustrates:
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Respondent: Are you also familiar with this Better Business Bureau for Nonprofits?
Interviewer: Yes. About their rating and so on?
Respondent: Yeah. So, they have twenty or twelve, I can’t remember how many
standards - they have quite a number of standards, I think it’s twenty. We now meet
all of their standards, and there are quite a number of organizations that do not, and
so, I actually found them to be very difficult to work with. But when I read through
their standards, I said, you know, “it makes sense” (Development Leader) .
Interestingly, only a third of all leaders discussed some form of standards when asked about
their implementation strategies. This is surprising, given that all TNGOs in the sample were
rated by Charity Navigator. As of November 2010, 61 organizations (40.1%) included in the
sample displayed their Charity Navigator credentials on their websites.
Lastly, the least emphasized response strategy referred to the need for training and
organizational learning (5.9% of respondents). One respondent described a strategy for
implementing accountability in this way: “We’re always changing the systems to try to get
better reporting, better accounting, making it easier, less time consuming. We just try to get
better at all of those things with new software, with new hardware, with new training. Folks
go for trainings in different things a lot.” Another respondent noted: “We continue to invest
in the training materials and methods we have so that we can deliver people the best possible
training.”While many have stressed the importance of learning for accountability purposes
(Carman, 2010; Ebrahim, 2005; Scott-Villiers, 2002), I found that few leaders emphasized
this. This is an important gap between prescription and actual practice.
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A complementary approach
Following a suggestion of Ebrahim (2003a), I recoded the respondents’ answers for
the categories disclosure & transparency, codes & standards and evaluation & auditing into
a broader category named tools of accountability—discrete devices—to understand what
overall response approaches leaders emphasized in their answers. Ebrahim (2003a) notes
that auditing often lies on the border between tool and process. In the context of these
interviews, I found that respondents most often discussed auditing as a tool used to evaluate
performance; however, they did not emphasize the process aspect of auditing. They did not
appear to emphasize the process aspect of auditing. I coded discussions & consultations,
and training, improving & qualified staff as processes (Ebrahim, 2003a). Table 6.2 presents
the overall distribution of answers re-classified as tools and processes.











aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
TNGO leaders generally lean toward to the use of tools (77.6%); 40.8% rely on pro-
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cesses and 28.9% on both. Once again, this highlights the nuances and complexity of re-
sponding to accountability when a single strategy, such as disclosing financial is insufficient
for a holistic approach. While respondents predominately mentioned tools for implementing
accountability, many expressed skepticism regarding their use. For example, a respondent
said: “Yes, policies are very important, but sometimes it is just a paper where we say [do]
that, a paper is easier than it [actually] is.” Compared to tools, the use of processes for
accountability poses challenges to TNGO leaders, since these approaches are less results-
oriented and may be less effective in demonstrating outcomes. Despite these challenges,
40.8% of TNGO leaders in the sample declared using them. As I show in chapter 7, the
leaders of TNGOs discussed several significant challenges to their accountability practices,
and many of them were directly linked to the operationalization of the concept and its
implementation.
Figure 6.1 illustrates how many respondents focused exclusively on one group of
accountability responses. While 48.7% of TNGO leaders in the sample noted the exclusive
use of tool-oriented responses to accountability, almost a third of the leaders (29.9%) used
a mix of both strategies. Few respondents focused only on processes (11.8%), as they are
complex and often expensive to implement. This suggests that the leaders in the sample did
not focus solely on results-oriented responses to accountability demands.
The added qualitative pattern analysis of the various response strategies for imple-
menting accountability showed interesting patterns. Table 6.3 presents only the seven most
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Source: Moynihan TNGO, 2014
Both
Figure 6.1: Accountable how? Tools and processes
recurrent patterns, which represent 60.1% of all 22 observed answer patterns, out of a total
of 32 possible combinations. The remaining patterns were either unique patterns (only one
strategy) or infrequent.
As mentioned previously, respondents offered few strategies for implementing account-
ability in their organizations. The two most recurrent patterns of answers diverged in their
mention of process-oriented accountability responses (evaluation, disclosure & transparency,
and consultations, 14 respondents) or tool-oriented solutions (evaluation, disclosure & trans-
parency, and codes & standards). However, the predominance of tools is apparent in all
of the answers. It is still surprising that despite the challenges associated with implement-
ing meaningful accountability processes, and given their subjectivity and intangibility (see
chapter 7).
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Table 6.3: Accountable How: Emerging Patterns
Description of the pattern Frequency Percentage of patternsa Cum. percentage
Evaluation 14 10.9 10.9
Disclosure & Transparency
Consultations
Evaluation 13 10.2 21.1
Disclosure & Transparency
Codes & Standards
Disclosure & Transparency 11 8.6 29.7
Evaluation 11 8.6 38.3
Disclosure & Transparency
Evaluation 10 7.8 46.1
Evaluation 9 7.0 53.1
Codes & Standards




aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Does Operational Context Matters?
In this section, I explore the various strategies leaders of TNGOs use to implement
their accountability and examine how these relate to their operational context. Although I do
not directly investigate the actual practices of accountability, but focus solely on leadership
views of these practices, the analysis provides valuable information on how leaders think
they should address their accountability needs and demands, and it is very telling of the
ways in which these leaders operationalize the ideas they hold about accountability.
Financial Health
The use of tools is not statistically associated with financial health (ρ = 0.59), while
the use of processes appears moderately associated with fiscal efficiency (χ2 = 2.13; df=1 ;
ρ = 0.14). However, the use of both set of strategy is associated with fiscal efficiency as
described in table 6.4.
In comparison to the overall sample of highly efficient organizations (76.8%),1, the
leaders of highly efficient organizations discussed in smaller proportion (68.2%) the reliance
on both tools and processes for accountability purposes. There is some indication that this
difference is worth further investigation (one-tailed test, z= -1.16; ρ = 0.12). ). The op-
posite trend can be observed in the responses of the leaders of low-efficiency organizations
(one-tailed test, z= -1.19; ρ = 0.12). Further research could shed much-needed light on the
1As I have mentioned in chapter 5, I conducted one-sided test to evaluate if the difference in proportions
was statistically significant.
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Table 6.4: Financial Health Using Tools and Processes (%)
Tools and Processes
Financial Health Not Mentioned Total
Mentioned
Low 19.4 31.8 23.0
High 80.6 68.2 76.8
% of Respondents 100.0 100.0 100.0
n (108) (44) (152)
χ2 = 2.70; df = 1; ρ = 0.10
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
challenges faced by low-efficiency TNGOs in adopting a complex set of responses to account-
ability demands and on how this might contribute to their poor efficiency. Likewise, further
investigation is needed to understand why a small number of highly efficient organizations
in the sample adopt this dual strategy in greater proportion.
Service vs Advocacy Leaders
The data do not suggest an association between the type of activity leaders engage
in and the use of tools (χ2 = 3.37; df=2 ; ρ = 0.19), processes (χ2 = 1.96; df=2 ; ρ = 0.38) or
both simultaneously (χ2 = 1.90; df=2 ; ρ = 0.39).
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Sector of Activity
In regard to the type of activity, the sector of operation does not appear to be asso-
ciated with the type of tool used: tools (χ2 = 1.98; df=4 ; ρ = 0.739), processes (χ2 = 2.57;
df=1 ; ρ = 0.632) or both (χ2 = 3.02; df=4 ; ρ = 0.55). This is quite intriguing, as scholars
have suggested that there are context-specific responses to accountability, depending on the
type of activity or sector of operation (see Brown and Moore, 2001; Ebrahim, 2003a).
Size
While the use of tools (χ2 = 1.12; df=2 ; ρ = 0.57) or both types (χ2 = 2.14; df=2 ;
ρ = 0.34) of accountability response where not associated with size, the use of processes
suggested one. I present the results in Table 6.5.
The data suggest that the leaders of large TNGOs relied on processes for account-
ability responses in smaller proportions (12.9%) than those of small (38.7%) and mid-sized
TNGOs (48.4%). This difference (8.2%) from the original sample is statistically significant
(one-tailed test, z= -1.39; ρ = 0.08), and is paradoxical, given that one of the main com-
plaints of TNGO leaders is linked to the costs of adopting these processes. One could expect
that organizations with larger budgets could ‘afford’ these complex strategies.
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Table 6.5: Budget Size Using Processes (%)
Processes
Budget Not Mentioned Total
Size Mentioned
Small 35.6 38.7 36.8
Medium 37.8 48.4 42.1
Large 26.7 12.9 21.1
% of Respondents 100 100 100
n (90) (62) (152)
χ2 = 4.39; df = 2; ρ = 0.11
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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Accountable how? Response
In this chapter, I have shown the various approaches TNGO leaders utilize to respond
to accountability demands from their stakeholders, which are shaped by their understanding
of what accountability is. I have shown that TNGOs have a wide range of strategies at
their disposal, such as evaluation, disclosure, consultation, codes of conduct, standards,
and learning. While leaders appeared to embrace the use of evaluation and transparency,
they also paid serious attention to process-oriented approaches to accountability. I have
shown that by grouping these various strategies under tools and processes, a more nuanced
understanding of their practices emerges. I found that while a greater overall number of
TNGO leaders emphasized tools or both strategies in their answers, somewhat neglecting
process-oriented approaches (see Figure 6.1), the operational context became increasingly
relevant for adopting the latter.
The fact that the leaders of highly efficient organizations adopted a mixed strategy
in smaller proportion than the initial sample would suggest, whereas the opposite is true
for small organizations. Furthermore, the data show an interesting paradox that warrants
further investigation.The leaders of large TNGOs adopted processes as strategies for ac-
countability response in lower proportions than their counterparts, despite having a larger
pool of resources at their disposal. This stands in contradiction to the challenges discussed





A TNGO Leadership View
In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I discussed the various answers to accountability questions
from the perspective of those engaged in global governance, and examined nuances in the
answers to the three central questions. However, the TNGO leaders faced various obstacles
in implementing their accountability activities and noted several areas for improvement.
Understanding these challenges is key to underscoring how interconnected these questions
are and to identifying the common obstacles faced by leaders in implementing accountability.
Organization of the chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. I first discuss the three areas of concern that
emerged in the interviews. I found that the leaders in this study discussed conceptual chal-
lenges. Generally, these fell into two groups: (1) narrow conceptual challenges, which focused
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on the difficulties of developing metrics for accountability practices and (2) broader concep-
tual or ideological challenges, which the leaders faced in pursuing their work and which
made their work appear unaccountable to others. They also discussed governance-related
challenges, which emphasized the importance of processes and systems in the whole account-
ability strategy. Lastly, leaders noted several communication-related challenges or areas for
improvement. These obstacles to accountability included pressure to conform to the financial
metrics and ratings used to convey accountability, a lack of quality in the information pro-
duced by the leaders’ organizations and the failure of information to resonate with various
stakeholders. In the second section of the chapter, I discuss an emerging consideration in
the debates: the substantive communication of accountability activities.
Accountability challenges for leaders of TNGOs
Despite their effects on all dimensions of accountability, we know very little about TN-
GOs leaders’ perceived challenges to reaching their goals. McCauley and Hughes (1991) iden-
tified twelve leadership challenges affecting domestic human service administrators. These
obstacles relate to leaders’ concerns about carrying out the mission of the organization; re-
lationships with various stakeholders, most notably staff and board; external constraints on
the leaders, such as time pressure; the working environment; and the management of lim-
ited resources (McCauley and Hughes, 1991). The leaders of transnational NGOs face an
even more complex environment than their domestic counterparts, as they must manage ac-
countability relationships at various levels. First, at the individual level, they often directly
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engage with large donors and board members. Second, at the organizational level, they
supervise and sanction the staff and their actions. Third, at the domestic/national level,
they are the public image and voice of the organization. Lastly, at the transnational level,
leaders balance their individual, organizational, and domestic commitments, while collabo-
rating across borders with partners or implementing their own programs in an international
context. This complexity comes with a unique set of challenges linked not only to the issue
of accountability but also to the transnational character of their activities.
Leaders were asked the following question about their accountability performance:
“On a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” is low and “5” is high, to what degree are you satisfied
with what your organization is doing regarding accountability? Would you please explain
your rating?” Responses were classified as low, medium or high. The results are presented
in Table 7.1. This latent coding was based on the justifications leaders offered for their
initial rating. The justifications provided a clearer sense of their accountability performance
than the scale that was given. Not surprisingly, the respondents spontaneously rated their
organizations as a four or a five. However, when prompted about their reasoning for such a
rating, they critiqued their performance and discussed in detail the challenges they faced to
improve their accountability.
For instance, 6.5% (9) of respondents expressed a low level of satisfaction, whereas
36.2% (50) expressed having a medium level of satisfaction, and 57.3% (79) perceived their
accountability performance as high.
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Table 7.1: Learders’ Level of Satisfaction of Organizational Accountability
Level of Satisfaction Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Low 9 6.5 6.5
Medium 50 36.2 42.8
High 79 57.3 100.0
Total 138 100.0
aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
For this chapter, I inductively analyzed the justifications offered by the leaders re-
garding their accountability performance. Only 75 leaders provided justifications beyond
their initial ratings. Focusing my analysis on these discussions, I identified three broad types
of challenges to accountability performance: (1) conceptual, (2) governance, (3) communica-
tion. Table 7.2 presents the summary descriptive statistics. However, as I will later discuss,
leaders often identified more than one challenge or area for improvement in their answers.
One respondent clearly explained a fundamental tension at play that can hinder
accountability efforts and which sums up all of the challenges in terms of one core issue:
like most NGOs, we are focused more on the results, on getting the work done, and
not so much on the evaluation because that takes resources, time, energy and efforts
and it’s a scarce and precious commodity. I think that’s always a tension, and I don’t
think we have invested as much efforts as we could have, or should have ... (Relief
Organization Leader).
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aPercentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
Governance Challenges
Governance challenges and areas for improvement were the most often discussed top-
ics. Leaders emphasized, on the one hand, the importance of discipline and rigor throughout
the organization, and on the other, the importance of sound accountability systems and
structures.
The leaders interviewed reflected on the processes needed to foster a good account-
ability culture within an organization, or the lack thereof. For example, an environmental
leader justified a low rating by noting: “[W]e need to do a better job of internal staff account-
ability.” The same respondent later added: “so as a maturing 15 years organization you need
systems, procedures, policies, management and stuff”. Better accountability performance is
linked to the establishment of codes and procedures within the organizations. Governance
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challenges, as well as accountability, are often complicated by an organization’s culture and
lack of discipline, as illustrated by the following excerpt:
you know we could probably be more disciplined in terms of the program staff in saying
you know you really need to show impact over the next year, we’re going to ask you to
come back with a report at the end of the year exactly. And from where I sit, I think
we probably need to be a little tougher and maybe a little more structured on that
than we’ve been in the past (Environmental Leaders).
This candid observation about a lack of discipline in implementing and enforcing
accountability processes and tools in the organization was a recurrent theme in the leaders’
discussions of their accountability performance. This organizational laissez-faire is related
to a lack of enforcement and, ultimately, a lack of monitoring of their own activities. This
is not to suggest that TNGO leaders ignore their accountability problems. For example, in
regard to accountability performance, one leader noted:
I’d say four, I think we do a good job but we definitely have some problems, not just
that we have problems with ongoing problems gone way too long, we can see them,
we’re just not effectively changing them (Environmental Leader).
While praising his/her accountability strategies, another respondent noted: “I really think
we’re very highly accountable. Where we’re not is in [our] learning systems. We try to be very
accountable but I think where we don’t is [in] our systems.” This raises the question: Why
do these organizations let accountability problems persist within their organization? Part
of the answer lies in the inability to take a system approach to accountability. By focusing
only on narrow aspects of the system, TNGOs and their leaders face various obstacles that
can potentially lead to organizational inefficiencies.
131
Chapter 7: Thinking Critically about Accountability
Employee turnover and a lack of clear information systems can be added challenges
to accountability. An environmental leader noted:
(...) it would be nice to figure out a way that wasn’t so time-consuming to get feedback
from the people overseas that we’re working with to what works and what doesn’t work.
We were able to do that in some places where we actually have staff, (...), but where
we are sending people only for a two week period, we’re really not getting anywhere
(Human Rights Leader).
Another remark, filed under governance challenges, highlighted the role of staff in
accountability performance: “I mean you know given the size of our staff. If we had a larger
staff there could be better internal controls about how money is managed. Given the size
of our staff and the way that we do things, um, so a five minus, how about that?” The
interesting point here is the idea that more human resources could improve accountability
and oversight. However, this could also potentially increase the amount of work needed to
conduct a full evaluation, thus creating increased demands on the organization.
An important lesson learned from the interviews is that transnational accountability
calls for time and structure. In regard to time, accountability can be both a short-term
and a long-term strategy. In the short term, ratings and signals would be the main tools
used. In the long term, with repeated iterations and evaluations, learning could be developed
and implemented. When working in more than one country, one cannot simply improvise,
but must establish comprehensive systems that will enable the communication of internal
issues. Disclosing internal issues is not without risks to an organization’s relationship with
its donors. Increasing competition among organizations, as well as the importance of donors
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to an organization’s long-term survival, makes governance issues perhaps the most difficult
challenge to overcome. Furthermore, these internal systems need to consider the type of
activity, the time frame, and the staff involved in accountability interactions, and they need
a well tailored plan, not a generic solution.
Communication Challenges
While the scholarship stresses the importance of financial accountability, few of the
leaders interviewed explicitly linked financial challenges to accountability; rather, they em-
phasized two aspects of communication in their answers. First, they discussed the prob-
lematic use of ratings and financial metrics for assessing their performance. Second, they
discussed the challenges linked to sharing meaningful information with relevant stakeholders.
Leaders often commented on their own rating of accountability by comparing it that
done by rating organizations. One leader noted:
I think comparatively, we’re probably a five and you know we rank high within Charity
Navigator but we’re not perfect and there are certain things for instance that we don’t
think (about). One of the Charity Navigators standards is to have a years worth of
revenues in reserve can we justify to our donors how we’re sitting on that amount of
money. So I don’t know that we’ll ever want to meet that particular standard to get
to the very highest level of Charity Navigator (Human Rights Leader).
While Charity Navigator’s ratings were often perceived as potential benchmarks, respondents
were critical of whether these standards were realistic to begin with.
An important tension exists between the need to externally signal accountability to
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potential donors and other stakeholders, and the need to respond internally to accountability
demands from the staff, members, and beneficiaries. The interviews showed a growing dissat-
isfaction with external ratings as being unrealistic and not representative of the work being
done by these leaders and their organizations. However, despite dissatisfaction with ratings
and external standards, a majority of the sampled TNGOs signaled their accountability using
ratings such as Charity Navigator’s. Since all the surveyed organizations were selected from
the Charity Navigator’s database, it is somewhat surprising to find that only 60.5% of the
respondents, at the time of their interview, reported Charity Navigator’s accreditation on
their websites, while 30.9% did not. Though imperfect, these signaling schemes are the most
readily available strategies for leaders and their organizations to demonstrate accountability.
It is because these tools are available, not because they are well suited to convey account-
ability, that they are being used by leaders and their organizations. Therefore, it would be
problematic to impute or presume a comprehensive understanding of accountability based
solely on such ratings
The quality of information was a recurrent theme in the discussions. For instance,
one respondent justified a rating of four by explaining: “Our website isn’t as easy to navigate
as it should be. The information is there [but] you got to do ten clicks instead of two clicks,
it’s that kind of thing [that limits accountability]”. Another respondent discussed the need
to share their information better:
well I don’t know what else I would do, to be more accountable, maybe I should make
that five, but I’ll say at least a four. I mean I’ve been here six months, so, I’m sure
there are things that we could probably do to increase accountability, maybe, maybe
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a better annual report, maybe a little different format, easier to read, something like
that, but I’d say at least a four (Development Leader).
This highlights the importance of the quality of information, not just its quantity, and
thus requires a shift from transparency to access and the intelligibility of information for
all relevant stakeholders. As this next respondent shows, too much information can also
compromise accountability performance:
Four. What I could do more, in some ways, it is a four to a five, in that I do not bury
my board with paperwork, okay. I am on the board of [an organization], and they will
send out, they have three board meetings a year, and they will send out this kind of
packet. My board packet is much slimmer than that, and I do not dump a lot of data
on my board. They get the emails, they see what is going on, but a report to the
board, per se, twice a year, a report to the board. Otherwise, they get the newsletters
(Development Leader).
A respondent noted their satisfaction with accountability:
I’m generally happy, I can see the results that we’re having, but I know that we can
improve. I need help to know how we can improve. Sometimes, often, but not always,
that help comes from the outside. I have a communications person working with us
now two days a week (Environmental Leader).
The need for better communication is essential for many leaders in the sample, as the next
comment shows: “I’m always trying to improve communications with our ever growing
community, I’m always looking for ways to do that.” The theme of communication was an
important one and particularly for transnational organizations. Only one respondent tackled
the issue of linguistic barriers to accountability:
It would be nice to be able to meet face to face with a lot of the organizations I’m
dealing with. Somebody in [African Country] right now, English is his second language.
He is not very good at speaking English and it has been very difficult communicating. I
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will send him notes, messages, e-mails that I will labor over for hours putting something
together that I think is very clear only to find out that he doesn’t understand it. And
I think a lot of these things if we could bring the recipient here, we could sit down with
them (Development Leader).
This issue should be further investigated, particularly in the case of transnational organi-
zations. While, presumably, many field officers should be able to communicate with local
practitioners, this potential challenge to accountability remains under-explored.
Conceptual Challenges
A first important challenge is tied to the inability of leaders to externally demonstrate
their organizational accountability because of a lack of suitable metrics. For example, a leader
answered critically to the request to give an accountability rating:
Um, three and a half. I think I’d like to see us have better measures to demon-
strate accountability. I’d like to have kind of defined criteria. I’d like it to be
more formalized than it is now. That there is a clear set of expectations between us
and each of those different stakeholder groups and that we can demonstrate that with
meaningful results. In some cases that’s data, in some cases it’s other ways [Emphasis
added] (Development Leader).
Another leader in the same field commented: “We want to offer evidence, not just
stories and good intentions but actual evidence, that based on good research methodology,
that we say the impacts of a scale and the sustainability that we say that we’re going to
have.” These answers best illustrate the general struggle of the respondents to measure and
demonstrate the informal practices associated with their accountability. This particular an-
swer highlights four interrelated issues: (1) the need for some clearly defined metrics, (2)
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the importance of a consensus on the chosen metric, (3) the sharing of clear expectations
among different sets of stakeholders, and (4) the importance of evaluating the accountability
process. These four issues are mirrored in a lack of consensus in the literature about what
exactly accountability is and about the growth of an industry of accountability standards.
These standards might be well defined, but they often lack the ability to provide clear ex-
pectations to sets of stakeholders interacting simultaneously within one TNGO. Concerning
accountability, the same respondent later concludes: “in the end who defines accountability?
Is it just us or the other party?” This points to an important question: whose standards and
expectations shape the shared understanding of what is accountability?
Respondents emphasized the fact that they felt they were accountable but that they
lacked the applicable tools to communicate it meaningfully. The following exchange between
the interviewer and the respondent highlights this:
Respondent: in terms of being accountable to beneficiaries I mean I would say that
it’s, that it’s you know it’s much lower, it’s like a two. But, but not because I don’t have
confidence in what we’re, again, coming from my math background, what, because if I
say oh it’s a five to benefit. Well how can I prove that, I can’t. I don’t have the tools.
Interviewer: no, I’m asking you to do kind of an estimate here
Respondent: ok, well I mean then, then if it’s an estimate. So if it’s an estimate of
how accountable we are to the beneficiaries. Then I, you know I’d say it’s a four.
Interviewer: it’s a four, not a two
Respondent: yeah, but don’t ask me to prove it
(Development Leader).
The following respondent goes a step further:
I think we could spend more time [...] creating instruments that help us gather the
information that we need. Because too many of them will tell you what they think you
want to yea, because they don’t want to piss you off because they want to make sure
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that you keep sending volunteers... time costs money and we just don’t have sufficient
staff time to really be brutal, but if you guys want to figure out a tool for us to do
that. You know, a real cross cultural, a real neutral way of evaluating effectiveness
[and accountability], truthfully (Development Leader).
In regard to areas of improvement, another respondent noted: “we are learning as we
grow in how to do that, and how to be more scientific about it and to define it.” This is
an important problem of TNGO accountability: recycling the same accountability tools for
any demand put on the organization. In other words, the most easily available tool?financial
disclosure?is the main tool used to express organizational accountability, though it describes
only a particular type of stakeholder relationship: accountability to patrons. This mismatch
between tools and demands contributes to the growing challenges to TNGO credibility, rep-
resentativeness, and efficiency in responding to beneficiaries’ needs. An environmental leader
suggested that these conceptual challenges were probably context-dependent and contingent
upon the mission of the organization.Environmental TNGO leaders generally discussed their
accountability in very diffuse terms, emphasizing its technical aspects. When discussing
their challenges, they pointed to the difficulty of proving their accountability and showing
results. This could mean that TNGOs’ missions and contexts of operation challenge leaders
in defining the type of accountability they need in order to communicate and the tools they
need.
While most of the respondents explicitly addressed the issue of measurement and
impact, some referred to broader conceptual challenges. For instance, one respondent pointed
to beliefs or pre-conceived ideas at work against organizations like theirs: “ some people
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are out to just undermine the work, some people have a stigmatic [sic] belief in violence
or something. Some of them are direct, sort in a pay the government, some of it is I
think originating with governments themselves who want to undermine our work....they
[some people] buy into it sort of with sloppy thinking and not really wanting an honest
understanding.”
The next comment justifying a leader’s answer sums up the conceptual challenges
linked to the use of relevant metrics to communicate relevant information. This respondent
also warns against the over-quantification of evaluation metrics:
I guess a four or five for effort but I would give us a three to four for quality learning
because I think that, a lot of people in this area quote Einstein and I forget exactly
the quote but he said, ‘you have got to make sure in impact that you are
accounting measurable things and then you have to make sure you are
measuring things that count.’ In the passion for metrics a lot of development
projects get into counting what they can count but they are not necessarily the most
important things. So its not what counts, it is just counting stuff! A lot of
money is then spent counting and reporting and at the end of the day have they counted
the right things? Were they the things that would really take you to impact and long
term change? So its not just counting inputs rather than outputs, or rather outputs
than outcomes, but the outcomes are what we want to get to. But to get there we
end up counting, often times, a lot of inputs and outputs. And are we even counting
the right things to make sure we are getting to the long term impact and outcomes
you are looking for? Sometimes it is not easy to tell if that input will really ever get
you that outcome. Is it the right input? Are the right stars in order? It might be
one right input but are the other three there that you need to have the ‘perfect storm’
so to speak or ‘your ducks in order’ whatever analogy you want to have to make sure
you get that outcome. So I think Einstein said ‘count things that are measurable but
make sure you measure the things that count.” I think in our accountability area and
impact assessment area or aid effectiveness, as a lot of people call it, we are counting
the wrong things [emphasis added] (Development Leader).
One respondent addressed aspects of these three broad challenges simultaneously. At
the conceptual level, the respondent noted: “I still think we’re working on the methodologies,
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Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
Figure 7.1: Challenges and areas for improvement
140
Chapter 7: Thinking Critically about Accountability
I think we still have a long way to go.” The respondent then went on to discuss the systems
needed for a systematic assessment: “You need to kind of get the chaos out of the system
in order to be able to kind of look at things systematically, and therefore you know be
able to report against something that you can explain.” The respondent then concluded by
mentioning the challenges regarding their accountability practices, explaining that they are
complying with major ratings agencies but that there is more work to be done. Figure 7.1
describes the major challenges and their overlap. Of the 75 respondents who provided an
answer, few respondents discussed these challenges simultaneously. More than half of all
respondents discussed either governance or communication challenges. It is interesting that
the literature has mostly focused on the conceptual challenges, whereas the leaders in the
sample predominately focused on other types of challenges.
Does Operational Context Matters?
Of the challenges discussed by the respondents, only those associated with governance
yielded significant statistical associations.
Financial Health
The data suggest a statistically significant association between the financial health
of an organization and the leaders’ answers. The leaders operating highly efficient organi-
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zations discussed governance challenge in greater proportion than the other leaders.1 This
is consistent with the idea that these leaders face governance challenges when they have to
respond to externally set standards (high efficiency). This balance is difficult to maintain, so
that highly efficient organizations and their leaders could be more vulnerable to these types
of challenges.
Table 7.3: Financial Efficiency by Governance Challenges (%)
Governance
Financial Not Mentioned Total
Efficiency Mentioned
Low 12.5 34.3 22.7
High 87.5 65.7 77.3
% of Respondents 100.0 100.0 100.0
n (40) (35) (75)
χ2 = 5.05; df = 1; ρ < 0.03
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
Service vs advocacy leaders
Leaders engaged in advocacy or service organizations also emphasized the governance
Leaders engaged in advocacy or service organizations also emphasized governance challenges.
1Although the difference of proportions are not statistically significant for low efficiency organizations
(one-tailed test, z= 0.69; ρ = 0.25) and for high efficiency organizations (one-tailed test, z= -1.07; ρ = 0.14).
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This difference was most notable for leaders of advocacy organizations (40%).2 The leaders
of service delivery organizations (37.1%) were also focused on governance challenges. It was
the leaders who operated both types of TNGOs who did not emphasize governance challenges
(only 22.9%). These types of organizations are very complex, so that it is surprising that
they did not focus on these challenges, or at least were not on a par with the other leaders.
Table 7.4: Main Activity by Governance Challenges (%)
Governance Challengesa
Activity Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Advocacy 12.5 40.0 25.3
(5) (14) (19)
Service 67.5 37.1 53.3
(27) (13) (40)
Both 20.0 22.9 21.3
(8) (8) (16)
% of Respondents 100 100 100
(n) (40) (35) (75)
Chi2(2)=8.87; ρ=0.01
a Percentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
2Although the difference in proportion is not statistically significant (one-tailed test, z= 0.90; ρ = 0.18)
and for service delivery leaders (one-tailed test, z= -1.02; ρ = 0.16).
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Sector of activity
Lastly, I found interesting associations between the sector of activity and the gover-
nance challenges discussed by leaders, which warrant further investigation.3 This association
implies that leaders operating in different sectors will emphasize their governance challenges
differently. Although I did not find statistically significant differences in the proportions,
this association adds to the empirical evidence suggesting that context should be considered
when discussing accountability.
Size
I found no association between the size of an organization and the propensity of its
leaders to discuss specific challenges.
Emerging Challenge or Potential Solution:
Communicate What?
All these challenges highlight how communication has received little attention from
academics and practitioners. The attention has been focused on answering the three core
questions linked to accountability, but has failed to reflect on the next step once these
questions have been answered: Communicate what?
Some scholars have emphasized the need for a better understanding of the effects of
3Although the differences of proportions are not statistically significant.
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Table 7.5: Sector of Activity by Governance Challenges (%)
Governance Challenges a
Sector Not Mentioned Mentioned Total
Environment 10.0 14.3 12.0
(4) (5) (9)
Human Rights 10.0 20.0 14.7
(4) (7) (11)
Development 37.5 40.0 38.7
(15) (14) (29)
Relief 35.0 11.4 24.0
(14) (4) (18)
Conflict Resolution 7.5 14.3 10.7
(3) (5) (8)
% of Respondents 100 100 100
(n) (40) (35) (75)
χ2=6.72; df =4 ρ=0.15
a Percentages have been rounded.
Data Source: Moynihan TNGO Initiative, available at:
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/
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transparency on accountability (Fox, 2007), and recent interest has focused on the use of
social media and the internet for transparency, responsiveness or accountability purposes
(Dumont, 2013; Saxton et al., 2007; Saxton and Guo, 2011; Saxton et al., 2011). However,
none of these recent studies has addressed the challenges faced by leaders in communicating
their accountability; rather, the focus has been on the outcomes. Furthermore, they have em-
phasized the transparency and disclosure of information without addressing its relationship
with definitions, audiences, and responses to NGO accountability.
As I have shown in this chapter, TNGO leaders struggle with the
operationalization of accountability as they fail to meaningfully communicate what
they do. While an organization might have various strategies for implementing accountabil-
ity, none of these strategies will be effective if the organization does not convey the relevant
message to the intended audience. The data reveal an important emphasis on communication
that was not captured by the initial codebook of the Moynihan TNGO Initiative. The theme
of communication is relevant to TNGOs and their leaders, as it highlights the boundaries
between internal and external accountability strategies. An organization can perceive itself
to be very accountable internally but can still struggle to convey this important message.
In this section, I explore more closely the mention of communication by TNGO lead-
ers in the interview data. I surveyed all the accountability answers of each core question—
accountable to what, to whom, and how?—to understand the relationship between the com-
munication strategies organizations deploy and how and to whom accountability messages
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are relayed. While discussions of the challenges clearly stressed the importance of commu-
nication in accountability discussions, the theme of communication was also present when
leaders discussed the three core questions of accountability.
When asked about their definitions of accountability, 11.1% of the respondents linked
accountability with communication. For example, the leader of a development TNGO noted:
That is [accountability] the spirit of what we communicate has integrity, and therefore is
accountable to who we really are. And so accountability and communications are just so
meshed with each other...How do I communicate truthfully what we do? (Development
Leader).
Interestingly, this respondent points to the importance of communication when defining ac-
countability. The content and the intent become central to the whole accountability process.
Similarly, an environmental leader said:
... [B]eing really transparent about the successes that we have and the failures and
struggles that we have, and try to communicate honestly, so that they [stakehold-
ers] feel as though their support is respected and their opinions are, are given voice
(Environmental Leader).
The notion of stakeholder representation is a recurrent theme in accountability discus-
sions. Since TNGOs’ organizing principles are often linked to a group they claim to represent,
it is surprising not to see a more extensive discussion of the link between communication
(what you communicate and how) and accountability within the literature. Another respon-
dent from a human rights organization defined accountability as a communication strategy
and discussed the issue of representation:
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Well it’s like a communication strategy, but there are 17 types of communication strate-
gies. So there, I don’t know how many are accountable. One level of accountability is
that when you are advocating something in the name of civil society or whatever that
you can demonstrate that this isn’t an effort of a few individuals who are trying to
claim they represent the people. I think that’s one of the common problems that you
would have on almost every level in human society if a few people trying to say: well,
we’re speaking for...(Development Leader).
This leader not only noted that there are various accountability strategies available,
but that conveying a message that is meaningful in respect to which stakeholders one claims
to represent is central to understanding what accountability is. This reinforces the suggestion
that ideas and frames of reference must be considered in relation to those whose interests
they affect (Sell and Prakash, 2004, 168).
Another emerging theme was connected to communicating the impact of the orga-
nization to its stakeholders. This differs from solely disclosing financials. A respondent
illustrated this by remarking on “communicating with our donors as to what we’re doing
and the kind of work that we are doing, giving them examples of the kind of social change
that we can create”. When asked to whom they felt accountable, another stated, “[o]ur
financial accountability is very important to us because we know that you want to be able
to communicate to your constituents, all of them, not just your donors that you use the
money well”. This last comment highlights the importance of the content of what is being
communicated in relation to its audience. Monies being spent “well” can mean very different
things to the various stakeholders of a single organization. This potential contradiction can
lead to conflicts between stakeholders, which reinforces the need for good, meaningful, and
effective accountability communication.
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Three key themes warrant further exploration. The first is the issue of the content of
communications. The importance of principles that guide accountability was an important
topic. Leaders emphasized the integrity and truthfulness of communications. Similarly,
when defining accountability, the TNGO leaders emphasized principles. This reinforces the
idea that a consideration of TNGO accountability must acknowledge the principled ideas
and material incentives of organizational leaders. Second, the leaders linked the notion of
representation with accountability. If a TNGO and its leaders want to be accountable, they
must ensure that the messages they convey represent the various, and occasionally conflicting,
views within an organization. This requires another important level of work as well, to
translate and promote access to the information. As Fox (2007) noted, transparency does not
equate to accountability, as it does not necessarily promote access to all of the stakeholders
involved in accountability relationships. Lastly, the question of the content of accountability
messages highlights the importance and difficulty of conveying the impact of an organization
to stakeholders. One can effectively communicate through financial statements, but leaders
still struggle to communicate accurately to various audiences what exactly these financials
signify in terms of achievement. In the next section, I offer a framework that enables one to
understand what needs to be communicated in relation to which audience one is seeking to
engage with, as well as the processes and tools that enable this.
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Accountability challenges: An overview
In this chapter, I have discussed the three emergent challenges discussed by the lead-
ers: governance, communication, and conceptual challenges. When discussing governance
challenges, the most-cited type, leaders not only emphasized the importance of discipline,
but also the paramount necessity of developing accountability systems and structures. I
found that the staffing of these organizations was fundamental to overcoming governance
challenges. Communication challenges were associated with the information side of account-
ability, including the content of the information disclosed. This is an important, yet under-
discussed, challenge, particularly in relation to transnational NGOs. Lastly, I discussed the
conceptual challenges emphasized by the l’eaders. These challenges are tied to the leaders’
inability to find or develop suitable metrics that represent their ideas about accountability.
As noted previously, despite the fact that more than half of the leaders discussed governance
or communication challenges, the literature emphasizes conceptual challenges. I also found
that governance challenges were associated with various operational contexts aside from bud-
get size. This finding warrants further investigation into which aspects of each operational




Lessons Learned, Moving Forward?
Overview of findings
This research project has focused on TNGO leadership views of accountability. Through
the open-ended answers of 152 TNGO leaders, I have explored the core accountability ques-
tions: “What is accountability?” “Accountable to whom?” and “Accountable how?” I have
shown that a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the leaders’ views gives us important
insights into these debates. First, the leaders in the sample expressed a complex and nuanced
view of these important questions.
For instance, in chap 4, I showed how leaders’ definitions of accountability could be
characterized according to principled, material, and regulative frames. Using QPA, I demon-
strated that despite emphasizing the material aspects of their definitions of accountability,
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the leaders most often offered a nuanced view balancing their ideals and their financial in-
centives. While scholars have debated over the dichotomy between principles and material
interests, the analysis of the leaders’ perspectives shows a third frame for their definitions,
related to the regulative structures (formal or informal) in which they operate. This further
challenges the simplistic view of the motivations behind an organization’s behavior. Focus-
ing on a simple tension between the goals, values, and missions of an organization and its
material interests does not capture the reality in which these practitioners function. Their
transnational operating environment further complicates their activities. I have shown how
different accountability realities are contingent on the sector in which an organization oper-
ates. For example, I found that the leaders of environmental, human rights and development
TNGOs subscribe to a more complex understanding of accountability, one that includes all
three definitional frames (material, principled and regulative) in greater proportion than
their peers in relief or conflict resolution organizations. This finding provides us with several
guiding propositions that should be tested in future research.
In chapter 5, I showed that while TNGO leaders emphasize their accountability to
patrons (upward accountability), they most often perceive their accountability to be a balanc-
ing act between their patrons and their clients. Therefore, models of accountability focusing
mainly on the patrons of an organization run the risk of exacerbating accountability conflicts
between stakeholders and promote one narrow view of accountability. I found an association
between the financial efficiency of a TNGO and the leader’s perceptions regarding to whom
they should be accountable. The more efficient the organizations they lead, the more TNGO
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leaders tend to shift their attention to their patrons. This, however, could be the prod-
uct of a self-reinforcing dynamic; further study is warranted to understand the underlying
mechanisms. Lastly, the types of activities leaders are engaged in seem to relate to which
stakeholders they emphasize. For instance, environmental leaders paid no attention to their
“clients.” One could argue that the diffuseness of their stakeholders could explain their lack
of focus. This also reminds us that a “one-size-fits-all” accountability approach cannot yield
meaningful results for TNGO leaders who understand accountability as something else.
In chapter 6, I discussed the range of tools and processes available for responding to
accountability demands. Very few respondents relied solely on one process tool; rather, they
expressed marked preferences for combinations of strategies. While the strategies tended to
focus on the short term, the mix of implementation methods, although incomplete, was quite
varied. For instance, the most common strategies for responding to accountability demands
consisted of the use of evaluations, the disclosure of information, and consultations with
stakeholders (10.9% of respondents). Respondents favored the use of one exclusive tool at a
rate of almost four to one. However, a considerable proportion of these respondents discussed
their accountability responses in more nuanced ways than the data initially suggested. The
findings indicated that there is some degree of association between the level of financial health
and the propensity to rely on both tools and processes of accountability. Further research
should pay attention to the direction of this relationship. The lack of association between the
type of sector and the leaders’ choices of accountability responses is surprising, given that it is
often assumed that accountability responses depend on the context. This lack of association
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might remind us of the importance of stakeholders, which I found to be associated with
the sector. A lot of emphasis has been put on the means of implementing accountability
rather than on the relationships involved. This myopic view favoring responses promotes
an accountability industry and the “fetishization” of particular approaches considered to be
legitimate, when the context and the people involved might require a more complex approach.
More generally, the evidence throughout this research project shows leaders often
pointing out the inappropriateness of the available tools and the failure of standards to
meaningfully communicate their accountability. They were also quite candid about their
own failure to practice what they preach within their organizations.
In chapter 7, which examined the leaders’ conceptual challenges, I proposed three po-
tential solutions. First, TNGO leaders need to clearly identify their accountability audience
and specific targets in order to present relevant and meaningful metrics to the stakeholders
involved. This is essential to avoiding “accountability dissonance,” the use of mismatched
responses when addressing an audience’s demands. Second, TNGO leaders need to promote
consultation and the direct alignment of their accountability goals with the implementing
staff. This can not only promote organizational learning, but also foster staff accountabil-
ity. Third, leaders must clearly identify their accountability frames (principled, material,
or regulative) to enable the coherent evaluation of these ideals. In conflating all the pieces
of the accountability puzzle, TNGO leaders are not well equipped to justify their decisions
and make themselves accountable to other stakeholders than themselves. In regard to the
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governance challenges that I have identified, I suggest two main solutions. The first is to
promote transparency beyond financial disclosure; the second is to implement clear inter-
nal governance structures that will enable TNGO leaders to more efficiently identify areas
where enforcement and monitoring are needed to minimize the lack of institutional disci-
pline. Lastly, to address signaling challenges, I suggest developing short- and long-term
evaluations and promoting the dual reporting of goals. Evaluating long-term goals with
discrete, short-term tools can contribute to the promotion of “accountability dissonance”
within the organization,
An important lesson one can learn from the leaders’ accounts relates to the impor-
tance of communicating accountability. If one takes the position that accountability is a
relational concept, thus making the leader an essential participant in all accountability re-
lationships, given her or his supervisory role in the organization, then leaders must demon-
strate a contextual understanding of their accountability. To communicate effectively with
the various stakeholders, a leader must consider several components of the accountability
relationships they navigate. Defining accountability in terms of those with whom they are
interacting can enable TNGOs and their leaders to devise tools and assess whether they
are suitable. Responding to accountability demands from beneficiaries with the same tools
used to respond to donors’ demands does not provide the appropriate information and can
potentially lead to “accountability dissonance,” where tools do not match the audience or
the definitions of what leaders are trying to accomplish. This important problem stems from
a fragmented understanding of what accountability is, to whom one should be accountable,
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Table 8.1: Summary of Research Findings: What is Accountability?






















n Material → results, manage-
ment, disclosure
•While material themes are prevalent in the lead-
ers’ discussions, they conceptualize accountability
as a combination of both material and principled
considerations. • Leaders engaged in advocacy
focus on material understandings of accountabil-
ity in greater proportion than others. • Leaders
engaged in service-oriented activities expressed a
more nuanced view of accountability, integrating
all three aspects of accountability definitions. •
TNGO leaders put more emphasis on the internal
aspects of regulative accountability than on exter-
nal rules, laws, standards, or codes. • Leaders of
Environmental and Human Rights organizations
express the most complex views about account-
ability. • Leaders of Relief and Conflict Resolu-
tion organizations express the most narrow views
about what accountability is. • Despite the im-
portance of laws, standards, and rules in their
sector, leaders of Conflict Resolution do not pay
attention to the regulative aspects of accountabil-
ity. • Leaders of large and mid-sized expressed
the most balanced views about accountability in
comparison with leaders of small organizations. •
Despite access to larger financial resources, lead-
ers of larger TNGOs emphasize the material as-
pects of accountability in greater proportion than




rules, codes, laws, standards
how one should respond to accountability and what one should communicate for account-
ability purposes. Without the communication component, the accountability frame is not
fully complete, integrated nor productive.
Lastly, I present in table 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 summaries of the general research proposi-
tions derived from the empirical analysis in this research project. These lay the groundwork
for developing specific research hypotheses to be tested empirically in future work on TNGO
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Table 8.2: Summary of Research Findings: Accountability to Whom?





















Patrons→ those providing TN-
GOs with goods and services
• Leaders of engaged in service-oriented ac-
tivities focus in greater proportion on their
peers and self-accountability than other
leaders. • Leaders of Environmental and
Conflict Resolution organizations are less
likely to emphasize their clients than lead-
ers in other sectors. • All leaders of larger
TNGOs perceive themselves to be account-
able to patrons. • TNGO leaders of smaller
organizations pay more attention to their
clients than those from larger organiza-
tions.
Clients → recipients of goods
and services provided by patrons
Self/Peers → those account-
able to the goals of the organi-
zation, its staff, supporters and
non-paying members
Table 8.3: Summary of Research Findings: Accountable How?



















Tools→ discrete devices empha-
sizing outcomes
• TNGO leaders generally favor tools to
implement their accountability. • Lead-
ers from low efficiency organization rely on
both tools and processes at greater propor-
tions than those of highly efficient organi-
zations. • Leaders of smaller TNGOs re-
lied on processes in greater proportion than
those of larger organizations.
Processes → put emphasis on
the broader course of action




Table 8.4: Summary of Research Findings: Accountability Challenges










Governance → discipline, sys-
tems & structures
• Leaders adopting a system approach
to accountability can overcome governance
challenges. • Leaders can develop short-
term strategies (ratings & signals) with
long-term strategies (repeated iterations)
to promote learning. • Financial efficiency,
sector of operation, main activity is asso-






Accountability Puzzle For An Integrated Approach
I have highlighted in chapter 2 how the concept of NGO accountability is complex,
multidimensional, relational, blurry, and multidisciplinary. Furthermore, I mentioned that
the key accountability debates were clustered around the : “Accountable to what?” “Ac-
countable to whom?” and “Accountable how?” I stressed the interconnectedness and inter-
dependence of these questions, but one should not presume that they follow a sequential
order (definition −→ audience −→ response). An organization or an individual might know
to whom they would like to be accountable and define their accountability accordingly;
however, they may not be clear about how to implement it (audience −→ definition −→
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response). Another organization could decide they favor a type of tool and process in their
accountability interactions and thus target a specific audience and define their accountability
goals accordingly (responses −→ audience −→ definition). Given this lack of directionality
among these core questions, an overarching framework must stress the various relationships
between them. To understand these linkages and the need to contextualize each of these
important questions, I propose the analogy of a puzzle in which each piece represents one
of the key question related to accountability. Once put together, these pieces create a “sys-
tem” approach to accountability. This analogy is helpful for illustrating how integrated,
interconnected and interdependent these pieces of the broader TNGO accountability picture
are. Focusing on only one or two pieces of this puzzle, as many scholars have done so far,
provides incomplete answers to the questions and does not allow for much organizational
learning: Where exactly are the problems located?
As illustrated in figure 8.1, to understand NGO accountability, I suggest that we
consider accountability as consisting of four interconnected pieces: definition, audience, re-
sponse, and communication. Considering accountability in this way allows us to avoid several
challenges and to structure an analysis of how people within these organizations, particu-
larly the leaders, view their own accountability. One can then compare and contrast various
accountability representations across different operational contexts and understand the im-
plications of one aspect of accountability in relation to the rest. Furthermore, this analytical
framework highlights the relational, multi-dimensional, and complex aspects of one, forced,
all-encompassing definition, as each piece is constitutive of the whole accountability repre-
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sentation. This framework is not tied to academic boundaries and thus avoids discipline





What is accountability? Accountable to whom?
Accountable how?Communicate what?
Figure 8.1: Accountability puzzle
While in their discussions scholars have emphasized definitions, audiences, and the
types of tools used for accountability purposes, as I explained in chapter 2, less emphasis
has been put on the messaging itself. Most of the discussions have associated accountability
with a greater need for transparency and disclosure, without talking about how the sharing
of information links back to the other aspects of accountability. For example, disclosing spe-
cific information about activities is one strategy for responding to accountability demands,
but the content of the message not just about the act of disclosing; it should be related
to what accountability means in a particular context and to the audience of the message.
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Transparency generally refers to the idea of disclosure and reporting information or data.
However, the act of reporting is not a sufficient condition for accountability; rather, it is a
basic condition for observing accountability in an organization. A growing push toward the
digitalization of organizational documents and their online disclosure increases pressures for
public transparency. These disclosure pressures, often equating accountability with organi-
zational transparency, are founded on the assumption that more transparency necessarily
leads to more accountability. However, “too much” transparency can lead to an overwhelm-
ing amount of information for stakeholders to decipher and can, in fact, hinder overall orga-
nizational accountability (Fox, 2007, 667-668). Fox (2007) distinguishes among various kinds
of transparency: namely, “opaque,” “fuzzy” and “clear.” In the case of fuzzy transparency,
organizations make information accessible, but not necessarily reliable or meaningful for
evaluating their overall performance. In the case of clear transparency, the information is
both accessible and useful for organizational assessments (Fox, 2007, 667). Therefore, the
framework that I propose also includes means for understanding how the message of account-
ability is interconnected with the definition, audience and implementation of accountability,
and the response to accountability demands.
Accountability Dissonance and Messaging
Part of this project demonstrated that TNGOs and their leaders are actively trying to
implement accountability. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether they can fulfill a
“democratic” ideal of accountability, but rather why they are struggling with their account-
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ability strategies. I explain this gap by the concept of “accountability dissonance.” I argue
that the leaders in this study are afflicted with ADD (accountability dissonance disorder).
Leaders express their accountability ideas with tools and processes that are mis-matched to
their definitions and audiences. To solve this problem, I propose to integrating the what,
who, and how of accountability into a larger framework. I suggest that we must add a fourth
important piece to these accountability discussions: the communication component, which
is at the center of this accountability dissonance. As I showed throughout the empirical
chapters, the communication of accountability is an essential theme in all accountability
discussions, yet it has been widely overlooked by scholars. Leaders often expressed complex
views about their accountability and struggled to effectively communicate their organiza-
tional practices.
I argue that the communication component links the audience with which a leader
establishes accountability relationships, the implementation strategies TNGO leaders deploy
within their organizations, and most important, the substance of what is being communicated
linking with what a leader understands accountability to be. Since this project tackled the
issue of accountability from a leadership perspective, the next steps will be to study the
diffusion of what is being communicated through the various decision-making levels of a
transnational organization. Do leaders conceptualize accountability the same way regional
managers, staff, donors, partners, and recipients do? Which components of the accountability
puzzle does each of these various stakeholders emphasize and which do they neglect? This
last piece of the puzzle, albeit preliminary, aims to stress the boundary between what is being
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done within an organization regarding accountability and what is being communicated to
external stakeholders of the organization.
I asked in the introduction, “Who guards the guardians?” The answer, simply stated,
is: they guard themselves. While they do face some constraints regarding their formal le-
gal requirements, the leaders of TNGOs have developed a rich array of tools and processes
for holding themselves accountable. However, their biggest challenges remain in communi-
cating their practices and thus addressing their perceived lack of accountability. This gap
persists and is exacerbated by accountability dissonance disorder. Implementing better com-
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Appendix A
Moynihan TNGO Study Sample:
Organization List
Important disclaimer: Please note that the list provided is in alphabetical order only and
is not organized by any other characteristics of the sample. This was done to respect the
anonymity of the respondents.
Action Against Hunger USA
Adventist Development Relief Agency
Advocates International
Africare
Aga Khan Foundation USA
Albert Einstein Institution
Alliance for Global Justice
Alternative Gifts International
American Himalayan Foundation
American Jewish World Service
American Near East Refugee Aid
AmeriCares
Assist International





Center for Biological Diversity
Center for Constitutional Rights
Center for Defense Information
Center for International Policy
Center for Victims of Torture
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Child Family Health International
Childcare International
Children Incorporated











































International Animal Welfare Fund
International Book Bank




International Foundation for Education and Self-Help
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission
International God-Parenthood to Herceg Bosnian Children Association
International Health Care Foundation
International Medical Corps















Middle East Children’s Alliance
Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
Mission Without Borders International
Mobility Project
National Peace Corps Association
Needful Provisions Inc.
New Israel Fund







Peace Action Education Fund
Physicians for Human Rights






















Trees, Water, and People
Trickle-Up Program
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee








Women for Women International













1. PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES
1.1. Personal Attributes
1.1.1. Where in the organization do you work (e.g., at HQ, a regional office, etc.)?
1.1.2. Would you please describe the specific role you play in this organization?
1.1.3. How long have you been in your position?
1.1.4. How long have you been in the organization overall?
1.1.5. Could you tell me if English is your first language?
1.1.5.1. If not, what is your first language?
1.1.6. Are you a citizen of (country where language above is spoken)?
1.1.6.1. If not, where is your primary citizenship?




1.2.1.1. Now let’s talk about your organization. Approximately how many full-time em-
ployees does the organization have?
1.2.1.2. How about volunteers? How many does the organization have?
1.2.1.3. Are most of the full-time employees located here or are they in other places? Where,
for instance?
1.2.1.4. We are also interested in how organizations like yours are structured. Would you
please tell me a little bit about how your organization is structured?
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1.2.1.4.1. Probe: For example, are you a federation, a coalition of independent organizations,
a unitary organization?
1.2.1.4.2. Probe: Are you more centralized or de-centralized?
1.2.1.5. Do you have any membership programs? Can you explain how membership works
in your organization?
1.2.1.6. What role does your board play in the organization? How would you describe the
organization’s relationship and arrangement with your board?
1.2.1.7. Has your organizational structure changed recently or do you have plans to change
your organization’s structure in the near future?
1.2.2. Organizational Goals and Strategies
1.2.2.1. In general, what would you say your organization is trying to accomplish?
1.2.2.2. Have these objectives changed any in the last 10 years?
1.2.2.2.1. Probe: if so, in what ways have they changed?
1.2.2.3. What are the major obstacles, if any, to reaching your objectives?
1.2.2.4. Are there any changes that you would like to see in the organization’s goals and
strategies, now or in the future?
1.2.3. Organizational Activities
1.2.3.1. We’re interested in how your organization pursues its mission and on which ac-
tivities it focuses. I’m going to mention several different kinds of activities and I would like
you to rank them from 1 to 5 (with 1 being low and 5 being high) according to how much
time your organization is engaged in each. In addition, we would like to know what kinds of
things you do within these domains. Here is a sheet that lists the categories.
1.2.3.1.1. Providing direct aid and services.
1.2.3.1.1.1. Activities:
1.2.3.1.2. Engaging in research and public education .
1.2.3.1.2.1. Activities:




1.2.3.1.5. Monitoring and assessing the effects of policies, international agreements, and
commitments .
1.2.3.1.5.1. Activities:
1.2.3.1.6. What other activities is your organization engaged in that I have not mentioned?
1.2.3.1.7. Would your answers change if instead of “time spent” we asked you about “re-
sources spent”?
1.2.3.1.8. How about for priorities?
1.2.4. Being Transnational
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1.2.4.1. People often use the word “transnational” to describe organizations like yours that
operate across national borders. On a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” is low and “5” is high,
how “transnational” would you say your organization is currently?
1.2.4.2. How does being transnational affect the way your organization operates?
1.2.4.2.1. Probe: Membership, leadership, policy agenda/agenda for global change, fundrais-
ing and expenses.
2. EFFECTIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
2.1. Defining Effectiveness
2.1.1. Let me ask you about the concept of “effectiveness,” which is something we all have
trouble defining. How does your organization define effectiveness?
2.1.2. Given your definition, can you describe to us a particular occasion when your organi-
zation was effective?
2.1.2.1. Probe: What was at stake on this occasion?
2.1.2.2. Probe: Who were the participants on this occasion?
2.1.3. What do you think facilitated your organization being particularly effective on this
occasion?
2.2. Comparative Organizational Effectiveness
2.2.1. How would you evaluate the overall “effectiveness” of your organization?
2.2.2. How effective do you think other organizations perceive your organization to be?
Why?
2.2.3. Can you name five organizations within your field, other than your own, that you







2.2.4. How do you compare the effectiveness of your organization with the ones you just
listed as particularly effective?
2.3. Intersection of Funding and Effectiveness
2.3.1. Can you describe how you secure funders and resources for your organization?
2.3.1.1. Probe: How does the need to secure funding affect, if any, the mandate/goals, the
strategies, and the internal organization?
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2.4. Accountability
2.4.1. Another governance issue for NGOs seems to be accountability. How does your
organization define “accountability”?
2.4.2. To whom or what do you perceive your organization is accountable?
2.4.2.1. Probe: Are there particular kinds of stakeholders that you feel the need to be ac-
countable to, and why?
2.4.3. What strategies or activities does your organization use to strengthen its accountabil-
ity?
2.4.4. On a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” is low and “5” is high, to what degree are you
satisfied with what your organization is doing regarding accountability?
2.4. 5. Would you please explain your rating?
3. COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION, AND COLLABORATION
3.1. Communication and Coordination
3.1.1. In this next section, we would like to learn more about the ways in which your
organization communicates and collaborates, both internally and externally. To begin with,
how do you personally communicate with other parts of your organization?
3.1.1.1. Probe: Are there specific venues or technologies that are particularly important in
this respect?
3.1.1.2. Probe: Are there more advanced technologies that you’ve adopted? (Such as: Wikis,
Content Management Systems, Web-conferencing, Skype, Text-messaging, File-sharing tools,
Tags for website classification, Rich Site Summary Feeds, Podcasts, Blogs).
3.1.2. How often do you communicate with colleagues in the field, and by what method(s)?
3.2. NGO Networks and Partnerships
3.2.1. Let’s now talk about how and why your organization collaborates with other NGOs.
In general, what are your goals and reasons for collaboration with other NGOs in your field?
3.2.1.1. Do you see any differences between “networks” and “partnerships?”
3.2.1.1.1. Probe: If so, would you please describe those differences?
3.2.2. Are you currently involved in any “networks?”
3.2.2.1. Probe: If so, please describe these networks.
3.2.2.1.1.Probe: Who/what types of organizations are involved? How did it get started?
What is its purpose?
3.2.3. Are you currently involved in any “partnerships?”
3.2.3.1.Probe: If so, please describe these partnerships.
3.2.3.1.1. Probe: Who/what types of organizations are involved? How did it get started?
What is its purpose?
3.2.4. What kinds of benefits, if any, do you see resulting from networks and the formation
of partnerships?
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3.2.5. What difficulties, if any, do other NGOs in your field pose for your organization?
3.2.6. Are there any particularly important lessons that you have learned from engaging in
networks and partnerships?
3.3. Broader Organizational Collaboration
3.3.1. Now, let’s talk about collaboration with organizations other than NGOs. Do you
collaborate with other organizations or institutions that are not NGOs and why or why not?









3.3.2. What difficulties have you encountered in creating and maintaining networks and
partnerships with these types of organizations?
3.3.3. Are there important lessons to be learned from these experiences?
4. LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT
4.1. We are now going to move into the last section of the interview. In this section, we
would like to learn more about leadership within transnational NGOs. What kinds of specific
skills do you think people working in your organization need to have?
4.1.2. Within your organization, how do people acquire these skills?
4.1.2.1. Probe: What kinds of opportunities are there for people at different stages in their
careers in your organization to develop professionally?
4.2. How do people in your organization move into positions of leadership?
4.3. How would you define what it means to be a good leader in your organization?
4.5. Are there opportunities for professional enhancement that you wish were available for
leaders like yourself?
5. IN CLOSING
5.1. Finally, is there anything else that you would like to share with us about your orga-
nization’s governance, leadership, communication and collaboration, or effectiveness? Do
you have any questions for me, or would you like clarification about anything that we have
discussed?
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5.2. Do you have any questions for me, or would you like clarification about anything
that we have discussed?
Thank you again for your time and willingness to participate in this interview. Your in-
formation will be combined with others who have participated in similar interviews and
analyzed to create a broad picture of transnational NGO governance, leadership, and ef-
fectiveness. This picture will help us better understand the role of transnational NGOs as
agents of change in the global environment. We hope to involve you and your colleagues
in our future initiatives designed to support your work. Please do feel free to contact the
principal investigators, should you have any further questions about the study. In addition,
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Variable name Variable Label / Value Labels 
 
PRELIMINARY DATA COLLECTION  
org_id Organizational ID  
org_sample In Sample  
 0 Replacement  
 1 Original  
org_sector Sector  
 1 Environment  
 2 Human Rights  
 3 Humanitarian Relief  
 4 Sustainable Development  
 5 Conflict Resolution  
org_efficiency Efficiency  
 1 Low (1 and 2 stars)  
 2 High (3 and 4 stars)  
org_capacity Capacity    
 1 Low (1 and 2 stars)  
 2 High (3 and 4 stars)  
org_size Size  
 1 Small (Budget < US$1,000,000)  
 2 Medium (Budget US$ 1,000,000 – 10,000,000)  
 3 Large (Budget > US$ 10,000,000)  
org_function Function   
 1 Advocacy  
 2 Service  
 3 Both  
org_cell_fiscalhealth Fiscal Health  
 1 Low Efficiency / Low Capacity  
 2 Low Efficiency / High Capacity  
 3 High Efficiency / Low Capacity  
 4 High Efficiency / High Capacity  
org_hq_location Headquarters Location  
 1 New York City  
 2 Washington, DC  
 3 Boston  
 4 West  
 5 South  





SECTION 0000 – IDENTIFIERS  
v0001           Organizational ID  
v0002           Date of Interview  
v0003           City of the Interview  
v0020           Coder ID  
 1 Coder 1  
 2 Coder 2  
 3 Coder 3  
 4 Coder 4  
 5 Coder 5  
v0040           Interviewer ID  
 1 Interviewer 1  
 2 Interviewer 2  
 3 Interviewer 3  
 4 Interviewer 4  
 5 Interviewer 5  
 6 Interviewer 6  
 7 Interviewer 7  
v0060           Respondent’s  Gender  
 1 Male  
 2 Female  
v0080           Respondent's Age  
 1 22 to 35  
 2 36 to 45  
 3 46 to 55  
 4 56 to 65  





SECTION 1000 – PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES  
v1020           Position in Organizational Hierarchy  
 1 CEO, President, Executive Director  
 2 Vice President  
 3 Program, Project, or other Director  
 4 Other position  
v1040           Tenure at Current Position  
 1 0-1 years  
 2 2-3 years  
 3 4-5 years  
 4 6-7 years  
 5 8-9 years  
 6 10+ years  
v1060           Tenure at Current Organization  
 1 0-1 years  
 2 2-3 years  
 3 4-5 years  
 4 6-7 years  
 5 8-9 years  
 6 10+ years  
v1080           Respondent’s  Native  Language  
 1 English  
 2 Other Languages  
v1100           Respondent’s  Country  of  Citizenship  
 1 US Citizen  
 2 Other Citizenship  
Organization's Human Resources  
v1141 Number of full-time employees  
v1142 Number of part-time employees  
v1143 Number of volunteers  
v1144 Volunteers central to operations  
v1145 Interns are used  
v1160           Organizational Membership  
 0 No members   
 1 Membership of individuals   
 2 Membership of organizations   
 3 Both   
Board Composition  
v1181 Board includes top staff  
v1182 Board includes founder  
v1183 Board includes volunteers  





Board Member Selection Criteria  
v1201 Expertise/skills  
v1202 Commitment/engagement to the cause   
v1203 Reputation/visibility  
v1204 Fundraising capabilities  
v1205 Political and social connections   
v1206 Other apparent criteria  
Board Obstacles   
v1221 Related specifically to the founder's presence on the board  
v1222 Conflicting interpersonal relationships involving the board  
v1223 Conflicting organizational/structural relationships involving the board  
v1224 Other issues involving the board  
v1230           Organizational Structural Change (within the last 10 years)  
 1 Recent structural change   
 2 No significant structural change  
v1240           Organizational Form/Structure  
 1 Unitary  
 2 Federation  
 3 Coalition  
v1260           Board Style  
 1 Informal  
 2 Formal  
v1280           Level of Governing Board Engagement  
 1 Passive  





SECTION 2000 – ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS , STRATEGIES, AND ACTIVITIES  
Organizational Goals and Strategies  
v2021 Education and public awareness  
v2022 Advocacy / policy change  
v2023 Grassroots mobilization  
v2024 Compliance, monitoring and enforcement  
v2025 Service delivery  
v2026 Research  
v2027 Capacity building  
v2028 Fundraising, grant management  
v2029 Other goals  
v2040           Goal or Strategy Change (within the last 10 years)  
 1 Mostly just the goals have changed  
 2 Mostly just the strategies have changed  
 3 Both goals and strategies have changed  
 4 Neither goals nor strategies have changed significantly  
Drivers of Goal or Strategy Change (within the last 10 years)  
v2061 Change in operating environment   
v2062 Funding/donor agencies  
v2063 Organizational structural change  
v2064 Mandate expansion  
v2065 Mission accomplished  
v2066 Other reasons for change  
Obstacles to Goals  
v2081 Time   
v2082 Bureaucratic and legal requirements  
v2083 Funding/money  
v2084 Staff/associates competencies  
v2085 Technology  
v2086 Founder  
v2087 Program inadequacies   
v2088 Political context  
v2089 Access   
v2090 Local resistance  
v2091 Lack of coordination  





Organizational Activities  
v2120 Direct Aid and Services  
 1 Primary activity  
 2 Non-primary activity  
 9 Does not do  
v2140 Research and Public Education  
 1 Primary activity  
 2 Non-primary activity  
 9 Does not do  
v2160 Mobilization of Public  
 1 Primary activity  
 2 Non-primary activity  
 9 Does not do  
v2180 Advocacy   
 1 Primary activity  
 2 Non-primary activity  
 9 Does not do  
v2200    Monitoring (policies, international agreements, commitments)  
 1 Primary activity  
 2 Non-primary activity  
 9 Does not do  
v2221  Fundraising, grant management  
v2222  Other activities  
v2240           Obstacles Facing the Organization  
 1 Internal  





SECTION 3000 – TRANSNATIONALISM      
v3020           Respondent's Rating of Level of Transnationalism  
 1 Low  
 2 Medium  
 3 High  
Impact of Transnationalism   
v3041 Organizational Structure  
v3042 Logistics (operations, coordination of resources)  
v3043 Membership  
v3044 Leadership (skills, language, political capital)  
v3045 Agenda for Social Change  
v3046 Fundraising   
v3047 Staff (skills, geographic distribution, security, etc.)  
v3048 Partnerships  





SECTION 4000 – EFFECTIVENESS  
Definition of Effectiveness Mentions  
v4021 Resources (material resources, money)  
v4022 Flexibility  
v4023 Innovation and innovative thinking  
v4024 Expertise  
v4025 Contacts (including networking and collaboration)  
v4026 Staff/associates competencies  
v4027 Stakeholder satisfaction and commitment  
v4028 Achievement of own goals  
v4029 Evaluation  
v4030 Other items mentioned  
v4060           Respondent's Assessment of Own Organization's Effectiveness  
 1 Low  
 2 Moderate   
 3 High  
v4080           Respondent's Perception of Organization's Reputation  
 1 Low  
 2 Moderate   
 3 High  
v4120           Orientation of Respondent's Definition and Practice of Effectiveness  
 1 Primarily results oriented  
 2 Primarily process oriented  
 3 Both  
v4140           Respondent's Time Frame for Effectiveness  
 1 Short-term  
 2 Long-term  





SECTION 5000 – ACCOUNTABILITY  
Definition of Accountability Mentions  
v5021 Financial management  
v5022 Contractual (contractual obligations, certification)  
v5023 Mandate  
v5024 Transparency  
v5025 Other definitions   
Accountable to Whom or What  
v5041 Board   
v5042 Staff   
v5043 Donors  
v5044 Host government  
v5045 Charter government  
v5046 Environment  
v5047 Members  
v5048 Beneficiaries, recipients, clients  
v5049 Mission  
v5050 Partners  
v5051 General public   
v5052 Other stakeholders  
Implementing Accountability Involves   
v5061 Policies  
v5062 External audits  
v5063 Internal audits  
v5064 Evaluation  
v5065 Meetings  
v5066 Transparency/public disclosure  
v5067 Board   
v5068 Consultation  
v5069 Agreements  
v5070 Other means of accountability  
Benefits of Accountability  
v5081 Growth  
v5082 Reputation  
v5083 Effectiveness  
v5084 Stakeholder satisfaction  
v5085 Other benefits of accountability  
Obstacles to Accountability  
v5101 Resources  
v5102 Organizational Culture  
v5103 Political context  
v5104 Donor Expectations  




SECTION 6000 – COMMUNICATIONS  
Mediated Communications  
v6021 Phone  
v6022 Email   
v6023 Snail mail  
v6024 IM or chat  
v6025 VOIP   
v6026 Conference calls  
v6027 Blog   
v6028 Regular reports  
v6029 Listservs  
v6030 Newsletters  
v6031 Web conferencing, virtual meetings  
v6032 Content management  
v6033 Website  
v6034 Other physical mediated communications  
v6035 Other electronic mediated communications  
Face-to-face Communications (with the organization overall)  
v6041 Meetings  
v6042 Open-door policies  
v6043 Staff retreats, workshops, conferences, training sessions  
v6044 Performance evaluations  
v6045 Visits to the field  
v6046 Other face-to-face communications  
Mediated Communications with the Field  
v6061 Phone  
v6062 Email   
v6063 Snail mail  
v6064 IM or chat  
v6065 VOIP   
v6066 Conference calls  
v6067 Blog   
v6068 Progress / field reports  
v6069 Listservs  
v6070 Newsletters  
v6071 Web conferencing, virtual meetings  
v6072 Content management  
v6073 Website  
v6074 Other physical mediated communications  





Face-to-face Communications with the Field  
v6081 Meetings  
v6082 Staff retreats, workshops, conferences  
v6083 Performance evaluations  
v6084 Visits to the field  
v6085 Other face-to-face communications  
Communications Goals and Benefits  
v6101 Coordinate tasks/manage logistics  
v6102 Develop/maintain/improve relationships  
v6103 Both   
v6104 Other communication aims and benefits  
Communications Obstacles and Challenges  
v6121 Cost of communications  
v6122 Time   
v6123 Organizational or interpersonal conflict  
v6124 Intercultural issues  
v6125 Political context  
v6126 Ineffective communications, lack of evaluation  
v6127 Other communication challenges  
v6180           Respondent's Personal Style of Communication within the Organization 
 1 Primarily informal  
 2 Somewhat formal  
 3 Primarily formal  
v6200           Communication Flows within the Organization Overall  
 1 Primarily non-hierarchical  





SECTION 7000 – NETWORKS AND PARTNERSHIPS  
Type of Organizations with which the Respondent Collaborates  
v7101 Intergovernmental / international organizations   
v7102 Corporations   
v7103 Governments/States  
v7104 NGOs  
v7105 Other types of organizations  
Collaboration Structures  
v7121 Respondent's organization is the agent in the relationship  
v7122 Respondent's organization is the principal in the relationship   
v7123 Authority is shared between respondent's organization and 
partner 
 
v7124 Other characterizations of collaboration structures  
Benefits of Partnerships or Network Collaborations  
v7141 Better Access  
v7142 Achieve better understanding of substantive issues  
v7143 Increased legitimacy and credibility  
v7144 Better results  
v7145 Broader programs  
v7146 Increased funding  
v7147 Enhanced visibility and presence  
v7148 Legal   
v7149 Learning  
v7150 Local capabilities  
v7151 Other benefits of collaboration  
Obstacles to Partnerships or Network Collaborations  
v7161   Loss of control/ownership  
v7162 Muddled management  
v7163 Reduction of resources  
v7164 Concerns about compatibility of missions  
v7165 Lack of confidence, concerns about reliability and trustworthiness  
v7166 Organizational cultures  
v7167 Time   
v7168 Other obstacles or disadvantages  
v7220           Affect towards Collaborations with Civil Society Organizations  
 1 Negative  
 2 Neutral  
 3 Positive  
v7240           Affect towards Collaborations with For-Profit and Governmental Entities 
 1 Negative  
 2 Neutral  
 3 Positive  




SECTION 8000 – LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT 
Skills Needed in NGO  
v8021 Strategic planning  
v8022 Commitment  
v8023 Relationships with people   
v8024 Communication skills  
v8025 Initiative taking  
v8026 Empathy  
v8027 Ability to learn  
v8028 Flexibility  
v8029 Fundraising skills  
v8030 Cultural competencies  
v8031 Integrity   
v8032 Experience  
v8033 Other skills  
Internal Skill Acquisition  
v8041 Modeling/apprenticeship/internship   
v8042 Practice and experience in organization   
v8043 Debriefings and evaluations   
v8044 In-house workshops  
v8045 Other internal modes of skill acquisition  
Reason for Internal Skill Acquisition  
v8051 Lack of funds  
v8052 Preference for internal training  
v8053 Other reasons for internal focus  
v8060           Focus of External Skill Acquisition  
 1 Short-term focus  
 2 Long-term focus  
v8073           Advancement Opportunities   
 1 Advancement Opportunities   







Qualities of a Good Leader  
v8081 Achieving goals in cost effective manner   
v8082 Effective relationships with staff and stakeholders  
v8083 Leading by example (willing to do the same as you ask)  
v8084 Ability to articulate vision  
v8085 Ability to be motivational/inspirational  
v8086 Good listener or ability to give voice to others  
v8087 Ability  to  say  “no”  and  make  tough  decisions  
v8088 Ethical  
v8089 Sense of humor  
v8090 Ability to delegate effectively   
v8091 Willingness to take risks  
v8092 Public diplomacy  
v8093 Network building, development and maintenance  
v8094 Other qualities of good leaders  
Desired Training for "Leaders Like Yourself"   
v8101 Peer learning and discussion  
v8102 Interacting with leaders from the for-profit sector   
v8103 Work and personal life balance   
v8104 Need for rest and relaxation  
v8105 Need for discussions regarding the transition from managing 
projects/programs to managing people 
 
v8106 Learning how to keep up with the pace of change  
v8107 Fundraising training  
v8108 Learning how to collaborate and partner more effectively  
v8109 Technology training, administrative training   
v8110 Other desires, suggestions, or obstacles  
v8140           Interest in Leadership Training and Professional Engagement  
 1 Low  
 2 Medium  
 3 High  
    
SECTION 9000 – INTERVIEWER DEBRIEF  
v9040           Respondent’s  Candor  
 1 Respondent was very candid  
 2 Occasional lack of candor  





SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION  
resp_age Respondent’s  Age  
resp_tenure_position Respondent’s  Tenure  in  Position  
resp_tenure_organization Respondent’s  Tenure  in  Organization  
resp_level_education Respondent’s  Level of Education  
 1 BA, BSc  
 2 Master  
 3 Master in Business Administration  
 4 PhD  
 5 MD  
 6 JD  
resp_professional_background  Respondent’s  Professional  Background  
 1 Civil Society Organizations  
 2 Private Sector  
 3 Public Sector  
 4 Religious Organization  
org_year_founded Founded Year   
 1 Before 1920  
 2 1920 - 1939  
 3 1940 - 1959  
 4 1960 - 1979  
 5 1980 - 1999  
 6 2000 or later  
org_year_ruling Ruling Year  
 1 Before 1920  
 2 1920 - 1939  
 3 1940 - 1959  
 4 1960 - 1979  
 5 1980 - 1999  
 6 2000 or later  
org_faithbased Faith-based Organization  
 0 No  
 1 Yes  
org_membership Membership Organization  
 0 No  





org_no_fulltime_employees  Number of Full-time Employees  
 1 1-5  
 2 6-10  
 3 11-20  
 4 21-100  
 5 101-500  
 6 501-1000  
 7 >1000  
org_no_parttime_employees  Number of Part-time Employees  
 1 1-5  
 2 6-10  
 3 11-20  
 4 21-100  
 5 101-500  
 6 501-1000  
 7 >1000  
org_no_volunteers Number of Volunteers  
 1 1-5  
 2 6-10  
 3 11-20  
 4 21-100  
 5 101-500  
 6 501-1000  
org_no_board_members Number of Board Members  
org_board_affiliated_cso Number of Board Members Affiliated with CSOs  
org_board_affiliated_private Number of Board Members Affiliated with Private Organizations  
org_board_affiliated_public Number of Board Members Affiliated with Public Organizations  
org_board_affiliated_education Number of Board Members Affiliated with Educational Institutions  
org_board_affiliated_other Number of Board Members Affiliated with Other Organizations  
org_board_non_affiliated Number of Non-Affiliated Board Members  
org_activities_directservices Direct Services  
 0 Does not do  
 1 Does  
org_activities_researchandpublic Research and Public Education  
 0 Does not do  
 1 Does  
org_activities_mobilization Mobilization  
 0 Does not do  
 1 Does  
org_activities_advocacy Advocacy  
 0 Does not do  




org_activities_monitoring Monitoring  
 0 Does not do  
 1 Does  
org_activities_grants Fundraising and Grant-making  
 0 Does not do  
 1 Does  
org_activities_other Other Activities  
 0 Does not do  
 1 Does  
org_region_africa Africa  
 0 Not present  
 1 Present  
org_region_asia Asia  
 0 Not present  
 1 Present  
org_region_latinamerica Latin America  
 0 Not present  
 1 Present  
org_region_northamerica North America  
 0 Not present  
 1 Present  
org_region_europe Europe  
 0 Not present  
 1 Present  
org_revenues_2001 Revenues 2001  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_revenues_2002 Revenues 2002  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_revenues_2003 Revenues 2003  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_revenues_2004 Revenues 2004  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  





org_revenues_2005 Revenues 2005  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_revenues_2006 Revenues 2006  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_revenues_average Average Revenues 2001-2006  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_2001 Expenses 2001  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_2002 Expenses 2002  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_2003 Expenses 2003  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_2004 Expenses 2004  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_2005 Expenses 2005  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_2006 Expenses 2006  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_expenses_average Average Expenses 2001-2006  
 1 Less than $5 million  
 2 $5 million to $15 million  
 3 More than $15 million  
org_chnav_rating_2003 Charity Navigator Rating 2003  




org_chnav_rating_2005 Charity Navigator Rating 2005  
org_chnav_rating_2006 Charity Navigator Rating 2006  
org_chnav_rating_average Average Charity Navigator Rating for 2003-2006  
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